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NOTE
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF




In 1994, Billy Best, a sixteen-year-old cancer patient from Norwell,
Massachusetts, ran away to Texas to avoid continuing his chemother-
apy treatment, even though his parents had consented to the treat-
ment for him.1 In another highly publicized case, fifteen-year-old Lee
Lor fled her home in Fresno County, California after police,
paramedics, and social workers "dragged her from her home and
forced her to undergo chemotherapy for ovarian cancer."2 Her par-
ents had refused to consent to the necessary treatment,3 a decision
with which Lee agreed, due to "her fears and her Hmong family's sus-
picion of Western medicine."4 These cases are just two examples of
situations in which a minor has experienced pressure to undergo med-
ical treatment against the minor's wishes. Other disputes have also
arisen when parents refused to consent to medical treatment for their
minor child, despite that the minor herself had expressed a desire to
undergo the treatment.5
In the United States, minors are generally considered legally incom-
petent to consent to or refuse most forms of medical treatment.6 Par-
ents generally have the sole authority to decide whether their children
will receive such treatment, and a physician may not treat a minor
without the consent of the minor's parent or guardian.7 Conse-
quently, when the views of the minor and her parents concerning
1. Richard A. Knox, Billy Best's Case Reveals Gray Area of Patient Rights, Bos-
ton Globe, Nov. 23, 1994, at 1, 19.
2. Kathryn D. Perkins, Kids Asserting Rights in Health Care: Support Grows for
Choice in Treatment, S.F. Examiner, May 1, 1995, at B10.
3. Alex Pulaski, Social Workers Meet with Hmong Family: The Big Question Is if
Authorities Will Let Daughter Return to Her Parents, Fresno Bee, Oct. 15, 1994, at B2.
4. Perkins, supra note 2, at B10.
5. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 768 (Wash. 1942) (discussing case of 12-
year-old girl with a deformed left arm who had "many times expressed the wish for
removal of the ... arm and frequently wept because of her affliction," but whose
mother refused to consent to amputation).
6. See Garry S. Sigman & Carolyn O'Connor, Exploration for Physicians of the
Mature Minor Doctrine, 119 J. Pediatrics 520, 521 (1991); Matthew S. Feigenbaum,
Comment, Minors, Medical Treatment, and Interspousal Disagreement Should Solo-
mon Split the Child?, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 841, 851 (1992).
7. See Sigman & O'Connor, supra note 6, at 521. Of course, as an exception to
the general rule, physicians are permitted to render medical treatment to a minor
without parental consent in an emergency situation. Id-
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medical treatment differ, or when the state steps in to compel medical
treatment over the parents' and the child's religious or other objec-
tions, the wishes of the minor receive little or no deference if the case
is litigated in court.
Despite this phenomenon, the United States takes pride in its
"rights-based" legal culture. The function of the U.S. legal system is
"to enable individual litigants to enforce, protect, and preserve their
own legal rights."8' The ability to exert control in the decision-making
process when personal interests are at stake lies at the heart of the
American legal system and its commitment to protecting personal
legal rights.9 Adolescents like Billy Best, Lee Lor, and others, how-
ever, are routinely excluded from the treatment decision-making pro-
cess when their health and bodily integrity are at stake.
The extent of children's legal rights is an issue that has engendered
much debate. At one time, children in the United States were re-
garded simply as the chattel of their parents, or, more accurately, of
their fathers.' ° The law relating to children focused not on their
rights, but on the rights of adults with respect to their children."
Churches and other charitable organizations provided the little pro-
tection that was available to minors out of moral obligation.'2 With
the advent of industrialization, social reformers, who believed that
"children needed to be rescued from the effects of the industrial
revolution," initiated a movement to protect children. 13 These re-
formers made some advances in the area of children's rights by advo-
cating the passage of child labor laws, compulsory education laws.' 4
and recommending rehabilitation rather than punishment for delin-
quent children.' 5 Since that time, however, the recognition that chil-
dren have rights equal to those of adults has evolved very gradually.
In fact, the recognition of children's rights under the law truly began
as late as the 1960s, when the Supreme Court finally recognized that
the Constitution provides clear authority for the protection of chil-
dren's rights.' 6
8. Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections
on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 79 (1984).
9. Id. at 80-81; Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fain.
L.Q. 349, 353 (1993).
10. Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev. 487, 489
(1973); Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Cli-
ent Relationship, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 259, 261 (1995).
11. See Ventrell, supra note 10, at 261.
12. Id. at 261-62.
13. Id. at 262; see also David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asy-
lum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America 205-12 (1980) (discussing the influ-
ence of the progressives on the adoption of child welfare measures in the United
States, most notably, the creation of juvenile courts).
14. Rothman, supra note 13, at 206-07 (discussing labor and education laws).
15. Ventrell, supra note 10, at 262 (discussing rehabilitation as an alternative to
punishment).
16. Id. at 264.
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The Supreme Court has held that minors are entitled to constitu-
tional protection in a number of circumstances. 17 In addition, the
Court has extended to minors the fundamental rights of privacy and
bodily integrity in the contraception'" and abortion contexts.' 9 In
keeping with this trend of affording children greater protection under
the Constitution, a competent minor's right to make certain medical
decisions for herself should receive protection in most instances as
well.2" If a minor has the right to choose to undergo such an invasive
procedure as an abortion,21 then certainly she should have the right to
refuse or accept other forms of medical treatment on her own behalf.
Once courts recognize that minors possess rights, the courts must
address the related issue of whether minors should have access to
counsel to assist in protecting and enforcing their rights. Many mem-
bers of the legal community agree that children should have some
form of independent representation when their interests are at
stake; however, they have not reached a consensus as to the proper
17. The Supreme Court has extended due process protections to minors in both
criminal and civil contexts. Minors also possess other civil rights and civil liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution. See infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977) (striking
down a New York statute that prohibited the distribution of nonmedical contracep-
tives to persons age 16 or over except through a licensed pharmacist and that entirely
prohibited their distribution to persons under 16 years of age).
19. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (invalidating a Massachu-
setts statute requiring parental consent or court order before an abortion can be per-
formed on an unmarried woman under the age of 18); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding that a state "may not impose a blanket
provision... requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condi-
tion for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy").
For a full discussion of the facts and the Supreme Court's reasoning in the contra-
ception and abortion cases involving minors, see infra notes 163-85 and accompanying
text.
20. This Note does not argue that minors should have the right to make all medi-
cal decisions on their own. For example, a minor should not be able to demand a
certain procedure, such as cosmetic surgery, simply because she wants it. Rather, this
Note addresses the right of minors to participate in treatment decisions that are medi-
cally necessary, either to save or prolong the minor's life, such as chemotherapy or
blood transfusions, or to enhance substantially the minor's health and well-being.
21. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 651; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
22. See, e.g., Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association,
Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, Counsel for Private Parties § 2.3
(1980) [hereinafter IJA-ABA Standards] (recommending the appointment of in-
dependent counsel for any juvenile in a delinquency proceeding or in need of supervi-
sion proceeding, or for any juvenile who is the subject of proceedings affecting her
status or custody); James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children:
Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 565, 578-80 (1976) (advocating appointment of independent counsel for
the minor, in cases where the state attempts to compel medical treatment over paren-
tal objection, when the wishes of the minor are not adequately protected by any ex-
isting party); Rodham, supra note 10, at 509 ("Independent counsel for children
should not be restricted to children accused of delinquency, but should be required in
any case where a child's interests are being adjudicated."); Angela D. Luie, Note,
Representing the Child-Client Kids Are People Too, 11 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 205,
20771996]
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role for the child's attorney.23 Several theories exist as to what role
the attorney for the child should play.24 - This Note argues that the
most appropriate role for the competent child's attorney is that of an
advocate, and that, accordingly, a competent minor should have an
attorney who serves as the minor's advocate in medical treatment
cases as well. The minor can effectively communicate her views only
through an advocate who presents those views to the court.
This Note argues that when a minor is competent, courts must rec-
ognize the minor as a party with standing in cases where the parent
and the child disagree over medical treatment decisions, as well as in
cases where the state has brought an action to compel medical treat-
ment for the minor when the minor's parents have refused to consent
to such treatment on religious or other grounds. Moreover, the com-
petent minor in these proceedings must have access to independent
legal counsel whose role is to present the minor's wishes to the court.
Parts I and II of this Note address the issue of standing in medical
treatment cases. Part I discusses the rights and interests of parents
and the state, the only two parties who have traditionally enjoyed
legal standing in medical treatment cases. Part II argues that courts
must recognize that the competent minor, whose health and bodily
integrity are at stake, also has standing. Part III examines the role of
counsel in proceedings involving children. This part concludes that
the most appropriate role for the competent child's attorney in medi-
cal treatment cases is that of an advocate who represents the wishes of'
the minor, rather than that of a neutral investigator or champion who
merely presents evidence of the child's best interests to the court.
Part IV examines the issues of capacity and competence as they per-
tain to minors. This part emphasizes the importance of competence in
medical treatment cases. Minors must be competent to make medical
treatment decisions for themselves and be able to direct their attor-
neys in those medical treatment cases that are litigated. After exam-
ining a number of standards for assessing competence, this part
concludes that the most logical standard is a rebuttable presumption
of competence. Finally, part V illustrates how the recommended
205 (1993) (noting that commentators suggest that a minor has a constitutional right
to counsel in cases in which they have an interest).
Although many commentators maintain that minors must be independently repre-
sented in judicial proceedings affecting their interests, there is still much disagreement
over this issue. See Howard A. Davidson, Foreword to Ann M. Haralambie, The
Child's Attorney at xi (1993) (remarking that the issue is "far from settled").
23. See Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolv-
ing Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523, 1551 (1994);
Haralambie, supra note 22, at 3; Wilber, supra note 9, at 353; Lurie, supra note 22, at
205-06; Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independ-
ent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681, 681 (1987).
24. See infra part III.B; see also Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohm, Foreword.
Children and the Ethical Practice of Law, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1281, 1287-88 (1996)
(discussing the various roles assigned to lawyers for children).
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model would operate to protect the rights and interests of minors in
litigated medical treatment disputes.
I. STANDING IN MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES TRADITIONALLY
HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED IN PARENTS AND THE STATE
ONLY
Traditionally, in a litigated dispute over the administration of medi-
cal treatment to a minor, only the minor's parents and the state have
standing.2" Such cases almost always arise when the parents have re-
fused to consent to necessary medical treatment for their minor
child . 6 Typically, a statute provides the procedures by which the state
can challenge a parent's refusal of consent to medical treatment for
the child on the basis that it constitutes neglect.27 After the parent has
made a decision regarding the type of medical care her child should
receive-whether it is an alternative course of treatment or no treat-
ment at all-a state agency may challenge the parent's choice and
move to obtain temporary legal custody of the child, allowing an agent
of the state to supply the necessary consent for the treatment of the
child.28 The decision whether to award custody of the child to the
25. An exhaustive search of relevant case law reveals no case in which the minor
herself was an actual party to the litigation. See generally 2 Thomas A. Jacobs, Chil-
dren and the Law: Rights & Obligations § 10:07-10:08 (1995) (surveying cases where
parents have refused to consent to treatment for their minor child and indicating that
the dispute is normally between the minor's parents and the state); see also infra notes
88-96 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the state has proceeded against
a minor's parents for refusing to consent to necessary medical treatment).
26. See Genden, supra note 22, at 578.
27. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-531 to -546.04 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (setting
forth the procedures for terminating the parent-child relationship on ground that the
parent has abused, neglected, or abandoned the child, or is otherwise unable to dis-
charge parental responsibilities); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 300(b), 305(a) (West
Supp. 1996) (defining "dependent child" as one whose parents have willfully or neg-
lectfully failed to provide the minor with adequate medical treatment and providing
for any peace officer to take such a minor into temporary custody); Colo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 19-10-103, -107 (1986) (defining "neglect" as including parental failure to provide
adequate medical care and providing for temporary protective custody for any child
believed to be neglected); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 901-909 (1983 & Supp. 1994)
(defining "child neglect" and providing protective services for neglected children);
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 39.01, .03 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (defining "neglect" as parental
failure to provide necessary medical treatment and authorizing a law enforcement
officer to take a minor into custody if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
minor has been neglected); Idaho Code §§ 16-1602, -1616 (1979 & Supp. 1995) (defin-
ing "neglected child" as one who is without proper medical care and providing for
court-appointed medical care when the child's parents refuse or fail to consent); N.Y.
Far. Ct. Act §§ 1012, 1021-1022 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996) (defining "neglected
child" as one whose physical, mental, or emotional condition is impaired as a result of
parental failure to supply adequate medical care and providing procedures for tempo-
rary removal of a child from the home by an agent of an authorized agency, associa-
tion, society, or institution).
28. Elizabeth J. Sher, Note, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care
Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 157, 157-58 (1983). "Legal
custody" is distinguishable from "physical custody." If the state obtains legal custody,
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state temporarily, thereby effectively ordering the child to undergo
the proposed treatment, is ultimately the province of the judge. 9
Whether the minor wishes to undergo the treatment is generally not a
factor in the court's decision,30 and the minor herself is not a party to
the litigation.
A less common scenario arises when the parents have consented to
the medical treatment, but the minor does not wish to be treated, as
occurred in Billy Best's case.31 No such case appears to have reached
the courts3 This absence of litigation is likely due, in part, to the fact
that no mechanism exists for the minor to challenge the parent's con-
sent when the minor does not want the recommended treatment.
Even if such a mechanism did exist, courts would likely view the mi-
nor as lacking the legal standing to initiate and pursue the case given
the general rule that the parents of a minor have the ultimate author-
ity to decide whether their child will receive medical treatment.3 3 This
part examines the respective interests of parents and the state in medi-
cal treatment cases in an effort to explain why, traditionally, a minor's
parents and the state have been the only parties who have enjoyed
standing in such cases.
A. Interests of Parents
In litigated medical treatment disputes, courts consider two parental
interests: (1) authority to make decisions concerning their children
and (2) freedom of religion. This subpart discusses the nature of these
two parental concerns and presents several reasons why courts have
both protected and imposed limits on them.
1. Family Privacy and Parental Authority in Decision Making
Courts in the U.S. have long recognized family privacy and parental
authority over their children. The Supreme Court has noted that
"deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition[ ] is the belief
that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over
one's children."34 Decisions of the Supreme Court throughout the
the minor remains with the parents, but the state has the power to make certain deci-
sions for the minor, even over parental objection. Id at 158 n.8. In contrast, when the
state obtains physical custody, the minor is removed from the home and from the
parents' presence and control. Id.
29. Id. at 158.
30. See Genden, supra note 22, at 578.
31. See Knox, supra note 1, at 1.
32. See id. at 19 (stating that "the mature minor doctrine has not been tested to
support an adolescent's right to refuse treatment deemed medically necessary").
33. See Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 852.
34. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979).
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twentieth century have granted constitutional protection to parents'
fights to rear and educate their children.
Because society values privacy and family integrity, courts accord
great deference to parental decisions.36 Two presumptions drive such
deference to parental authority. First, courts believe that "parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. '37 Second,
lawmakers presume that the "natural bonds of affection" cause par-
ents to act in their child's best interests.38 Courts also recognize that
parental autonomy in decision making is an essential element of pre-
serving integrity of the family.39 Parental autonomy to care for chil-
dren free from government interference contributes to the physical
and psychological well-being of the child by promoting continuity in
the child's life.4 ° Consequently, parents generally have the right to
make decisions for their children without state interference,4' and, in
fact, state intervention in the parent-child relationship is justifiable
only when the state can demonstrate "a powerful countervailing inter-
est."'42 Parental authority in decision making generally includes the
35. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("[C]onstitutional inter-
pretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our soci-
ety."); see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (stating that "the relation-
ship between parent and child is constitutionally protected"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that state compulsory education law as applied to
Amish children violated parents' right to raise their children according to their reli-
gious beliefs); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that unwed father's
interest in the children he has raised deserves deference and protection); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that state law prohibiting par-
ents from sending their children to private schools interferes unreasonably with their
right to choose their child's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01
(1923) (holding that state statute criminalizing the teaching of German language to
elementary school students violates parents' right to educate their children).
36. Sher, supra note 28, at 171. For example, the Supreme Court has articulated
that an "important justification for state deference to parental control over children is
that '[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.'" Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637 (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at
535).
37. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
38. Id.; see also Sher, supra note 28, at 171-72 (noting that courts accord great
deference to parental decisions on the assumption that parents ordinarily act in their
child's best interests).
39. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1991) (citing Quilloin, 434
U.S. at 255, Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232, and Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35).
40. See Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk." On State Superven-
tion of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L. 645, 649 & nn.13-14 (1977).
41. Sher, supra note 28, at 171; see, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obli-
gations the state can neither supply nor hinder.").
42. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right
20811996]
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right of parents to make the important decision of whether and when
their minor children will receive medical treatment.43
2. Freedom of Religion
Another parental interest often cited in medical treatment cases is
the right to free exercise of religion, guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.' Consideration of parents' religious beliefs in medical treat-
ment cases comes into play when the parents' religion prohibits the
use of certain medical procedures, as is the case with Jehovah's Wit-
nesses,45 or prohibits resorting to medical treatment at all, as does the
Christian Science Church.46
Courts have long recognized parents' rights to provide their chil-
dren with religious training and to encourage them in the practice of
religious beliefs without undue state interference.47 While the govern-
to "establish a home and bring up children," which right "may not be interfered with,
under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbi-
trary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State to effect").
43. See Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 851 (stating that parents are usually en-
trusted to make important decisions regarding the health and welfare of their
children).
44. See cases cited infra notes 88-90, 93-94 and accompanying text.
45. While not opposed to medical treatment or surgery per se, Jehovah's Wit-
nesses oppose blood transfusions, which are often a necessary component of medical
and surgical procedures. See Mike McKee, Blood Feud; When Jehovah's Witnesses
Refuse Transfusions Based on Their Beliefs, the Legal and Medical Guidelines Are Far
from Clear, The Recorder, Aug. 15, 1995, at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Papers File. Witnesses refuse blood transfusions on the ground that such a procedure
is akin to eating blood, a practice strictly forbidden in the Bible. Julie A. Koehne,
Witnesses on Trial: Judicial Intrusion upon the Practices of Jehovah's Witness Parents,
21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 205, 207 (1993).
46. In contrast to Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists rely on spiritual aid
and the healing power of prayer instead of conventional medical treatment. Steven
Schneider, Christian Science and the Law: Room for Compromise?, I Colum. J.L. &
Soc. Probs. 81, 81 (1965). "Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of the Christian Science
Church, professed a deep belief in spirituality." Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108,
1109 n.2 (Del. 1991). She preached that sickness was a manifestation of a diseased
mind and claimed that "[mledicine will not arrive at the Science of treating disease
until disease is treated mentally and man is healed morally and physically." Id. (quot-
ing Mary Baker Eddy, Sermon Subject: Christian Healing, in Prose Works Other than
Science & Health with Key to the Scriptures 14 (1886)). Thus, Christian Scientists do
not treat most sicknesses with medical care; instead, they rely on practitioners who
administer spiritual aid. Id.
47. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("[A] State's interest in
universal education.., is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges
on fundamental rights and interests, such as ... the traditional interest of parents with
respect to the religious upbringing of their children .... "); West Virginia State Bd. of
Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that to compel Jehovah's Witness
children to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise "transcends constitutional
limitations on [local school authorities'] power and invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment... to reserve from all official
control"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding that Ore-
gon law prohibiting parents from sending their children to parochial school "inter-
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ment cannot interfere with religious beliefs, conduct in the pursuit of
such beliefs is subject to governmental restraint.4" Accordingly, in
1944, the Court, in Prince v. Massachusetts,49 sharply curtailed the
freedom of parents to make decisions affecting the welfare of their
children.50 In rejecting the appellant's argument that a state statute
prohibiting the sale or distribution of literature by minors violated her
right to the free exercise of religion, the Court stated: "Parents may
be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when
they can make that choice for themselves." 51 Thus, while religious
freedom and parental authority are two parental interests that courts
accord much respect, "neither right is beyond limitation." 52
B. Interests of the State
In addition to parental interests, the state often has interests at
stake in medical treatment cases as well. In any case where the minor,
the parent, or both wish to refuse treatment for the minor, the state
may have compelling reasons to oppose such a decision. This subpart
discusses the relevant interests of the state in medical treatment cases
and illustrates those instances when state interests trump the parental
concerns discussed above.
1. The State's Role as Parens Patriae
Although "the tradition of parental authority is ... one of the basic
presuppositions ' 53 of individual liberty, the state often has the power
to limit parental freedom and authority when parents endanger the
feres with liberty of parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of [their]
children").
48. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). Considering governmental
regulation of polygamy, the Court stated: "Laws are made for the government of
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices." Id.
49. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
50. In Prince, the Court upheld a Massachusetts child labor statute making it a
crime for any adult to provide a minor boy under the age of 12 or a minor girl under
the age of 18 with merchandise that the adult knows the minor child intends to sell in
the street or in any public place. Id. at 160-61, 171. The appellant, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, had been convicted and fined for permitting her ward, a nine-year-old girl, to
distribute religious literature in the streets in violation of the statute. Id. at 159-60.
The Jehovah's Witnesses' practice of permitting children" 'to preach the gospel.., by
public distribution' ... [is] in conformity with the scripture: 'A little child shall lead
them.'" Id. at 164. Appellant argued, but failed to persuade the court, that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional because it interfered with her right to the free exercise of her
religious convictions. Id at 159.
51. Id. at 170.
52. Darrel J. Scott, Withholding Consent for Medical Care of a Child. The Ulti-
mate Parental Decision, 23 J. Health & Hosp. L. 84, 85 (1990).
53. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979).
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welfare of children.54 The state's parens patriae power permits inter-
vention in private relationships to promote the best interests of a par-
ticular individual.5 5 The state invokes its parens patriae power to
protect those members of society who are unable to protect them-
selves.56 Children are an obvious category of persons often in need of
such protection.57
The Supreme Court has recognized that the state can limit parents'
rights when their children's physical or mental well-being is in jeop-
ardy.5 8 For example, the state may restrict parents' authority over
their children by requiring school attendance 5 9 regulating or prohibit-
ing child labor,60 and compelling vaccinations.6' In general, the state
may exercise its parens patriae power when parents have failed to pro-
vide proper care for their child,62 or when parental decisions threaten
the child's health and safety.63 In the event that the minor is placed in
danger by a parent who fails to provide proper protection, the state
will move to take custody of the minor through court action.64
The state may invoke its parens patriae power at any time during a
person's minority.65 This power is strongest, however, when the child
is young and immature, and therefore lacks the capacity to make deci-
sions for herself.66 Thus, "[t]he parens patriae authority fades ... as
the minor gets older," and eventually disappears when the child
reaches adulthood. 67
54. Jennifer F. Skeels, Note, In re E.G.: The Right of Mature Minors in Illinois to
Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1199, 1202 (1990).
55. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 1156, 1198-1202 (1980).
56. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (IMI. 1989).
57. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (describing the state
as the "guardian of all infants").
58. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
230 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d
271, 276 (Colo. 1982); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1991); State v.
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 757 (N.J.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
59. State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 731-32 (Ind. 1901).
60. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320,
325-26 (1913).
61. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 35 (1905).
62. Sher, supra note 28, at 170; see also Saratoga County Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that "the State, as parens pa-
triae, may intervene to ensure that a child's health or welfare is not being seriously
jeopardized by a parent's fault or omission"); In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 775 (Wash.
1942) ("[W]here the parents fail to perform their natural duty so to rear and educate
the child[,] ... the state, as parens patriae of all children, may assert its power and
apply curative measures, so as to prevent injury to the child and to society .... ").
63. William D. Brewster, Note, In re E.G., a Minor: Death Over Life: A Judicial
Trend Continues As the Illinois Supreme Court Grants Minors the Right to Refuse
Life-Saving Medical Treatment, 23 J. Marshall L. Rev. 771, 780 (1990).
64. Scott, supra note 52, at 87.
65. Id.
66. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989).
67. Id.
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The state's parens patriae power is clearly at issue in cases where
parents refuse to consent to necessary medical treatment for their mi-
nor child. This power underlies state child abuse and neglect stat-
utes,68 and authorizes the state to institute dependency proceedings to
transfer legal custody of a minor from the parent to the state.69 As a
result of these proceedings, the court may appoint a guardian who has
authority to make the treatment decision that best serves the minor's
interests. 7° Thus, when the state moves for temporary legal custody of
a minor, pursuant to abuse, neglect, and dependency statutes, in order
to compel necessary medical treatment, the state relies on its parens
patriae power.
2. Other State Interests
The state has other interests that support intervention into the par-
ent-child relationship. For instance, the parens patriae doctrine is
grounded in the belief that the state has a strong interest in preserving
human life.71 Thus, when a parent's affirmative conduct or neglect
threatens the life of the child, the state has a duty to intervene. 72 This
duty clearly arises when a parent refuses to consent to life-saving med-
ical treatment for her child.73
In addition, the state, as guardian of the health and welfare of soci-
ety at large, has an interest in ensuring the goal of a productive and
self-perpetuating society.74 By taking steps to keep children free from
harm, the state enables future adults to contribute to and thrive in
society.75 Protecting the welfare of children also conserves the state's
limited resources by preventing children from becoming wards of the
state.76
68. See Joyce Lind Terres, Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: How Should the Govern-
ment Intervene?, 18 Am. J. Crim. L. 61, 70 (1990); Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 858.
69. Kristen Rachelle Lichtenberg, Note, Gestational Substance Abuse; A Call For
A Thoughtful Legislative Response, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 377, 384 (1990).
70. Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 858.
71. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1990); New-
mark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108,1116 (Del. 1991); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322,327 (IMI.
1989); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass. 1977).
72. See E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327. There, the court stated that "[w]hen a minor's
health and life are at stake, this policy [valuing the sanctity of life] becomes a critical
consideration. A minor may have a long and fruitful life ahead that an immature,
foolish decision could jeopardize." IL
73. See Belchertown, 370 N.E.2d at 426 (discussing the state's interest in protecting
children from the potentially harmful decisions of their parents).
74. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("A democratic society
rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.").
75. Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 857.
76. Id at 857 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 394 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)); see also Marcia Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980s: Child Welfare Impact
Litigation After the Warren Years, 20 Far. L.Q. 255, 257 (1986) (stating that failure of
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Finally, the state has an interest in protecting the ethical integrity of
the medical profession.77 As one commentator stated: "The success
of the medical profession depends on maintaining the public's confi-
dence that physicians will conduct themselves pursuant to... estab-
lished [ethical] principles."78  The Hippocratic dictum, "I will
prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability
and my judgment and never do harm to anyone,' 79 reflects the princi-
ple that doctors should strive to enhance their patients' health and
well-being, not remain inactive and watch them deteriorate."0 Thus,
when parents refuse to consent to medical treatment for their minor
children and the medical profession fails to intervene in contravention
of these established ethical principles, society's trust in the medical
profession is undermined."'
C. Balancing the Interests in Medical Treatment Cases
Thus far, most, if not all, reported medical treatment cases have
arisen when parents have refused to consent to treatment for their
child, for whatever reason." Even though the child's interests are at
stake in medical treatment cases, courts tend to consider only the par-
ents' and the state's interests in the outcome.8 3 The interests of the
child are deemed secondary, if considered at all.
When presented with a case where parents have refused to consent
to medical treatment for their child, courts generally apply a balancing
test-"an evaluation of the risk of the procedure compared to its po-
tential success." 84 Courts generally consider two main factors. First,
the court considers the effectiveness of the proposed treatment and
determines the child's chances of survival with and without it. Second,
the court evaluates the nature of the treatment and its effect, physi-
cally and emotionally, on the child.v5 The probability of state inter-
state intervention at early stages results in increased costs du& to dependency in the
long run).
77. Belchertown, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
78. Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 858.
79. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 650 (24th ed. 1982).
80. See Lisa E. Hanger, The Legal, Ethical, and Medical Objections to Procuring
Organs from Anencephalic Infants, 5 Health Matrix 347, 359-60 & n.56 (1995).
81. Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 858.
82. See Sher, supra note 28, at 157-58 (stating that "[i]n the typical medical care
decisionmaking case, parents have made a good faith decision regarding the type of
medical care their child should receive, and a state agency challenges that choice'as
constituting statutory child neglect"); see also infra notes 84-96, 99 and accompanying
text (surveying cases in which the state has sought to compel medical treatment over
parental objection).
83. Sher, supra note 28, at 167-73.
84. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Del. 1991).
85. See, e.g., County of Contra Costa Dep't of Social Servs. v. Ted B., 235 Cal.
Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1987) ("The state should examine the seriousness of the harm
the child is suffering or the substantial likelihood that he will suffer serious harm; the
evaluation for the treatment by the medical profession; the risks involved in medically
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vention on the minor's behalf increases as the risk to the minor grows
greater and more imminent.86
Thus, courts uniformly order medical treatment over parental ob-
jection when the child's condition is life-threatening,87 regardless of
the proffered justification for the objection. For example, courts rou-
tinely compel treatment for the child when the parental objection is to
blood transfusions, based on religious grounds.88 In fact, in Jehovah's
Witnesses v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1,89 the Supreme Court
indicated its approval of such action when it upheld the constitutional-
ity of a Washington statute construed to permit judges to authorize a
necessary blood transfusion for a minor over a parent's refusal on reli-
gious groundsf 0
In addition, courts will authorize other types of medical treatment
for a minor over the parents' objections when the treatment is "rela-
tively innocuous in comparison to the dangers of withholding medical
treating the child; and the expressed preferences of the child." (quoting In re Philip
B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980))); New-
mark, 588 A.2d at 1117-18 (balancing effectiveness of treatment against nature of
treatment in case where Christian Scientist parents refused to consent to chemother-
apy for their child with Burkitt's Lymphoma); Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053,
1065-66 (Mass. 1978) (considering effectiveness and adverse effects of chemotherapy
in determining whether to order such treatment for three-year-old child).
86. Scott, supra note 52, at 88 ("As the immediacy and magnitude of potential for
harm to the child increases, the likelihood for government involvement increases for
the child's protection.").
87. Sher, supra note 28, at 162; see also Developments in the Law-Medical Tech-
nology and the Law, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1519, 1596 (1990) [hereinafter Developments-
Medical] (stating that "the state may... authorize blood transfusions and other life-
saving treatments, and require medical attention to certain less threatening problems
in order to avert more severe ailments in the future" (footnotes omitted)).
88. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1., 278 F. Supp.
488, 503, 508 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (authorizing blood transfusion where "safe" and
necessary), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 771, 774
(Ill.) (affirming trial court's order of blood transfusion for infant suffering from a fatal
blood condition over parents' religious objection), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952);
State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 759-60 (N.J.) (affirming trial court's order of blood
transfusion for child needing surgery for heart malfunction over parents' religious
objection), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d
518, 519, 521 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (authorizing blood transfusion for pre-
mature infant born with jaundice over parents' religious objection); In re Clark, 185
N.E.2d 128, 129-30 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1962) (authorizing blood transfusion for three-
year-old child with second and third degree bums over 40% of his body over parents'
religious objection); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (author-
izing blood transfusion where it was 90% effective to treat child's illness). But see In
re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322,323-24 (IMI. 1989) (affirming appellate court decision refusing
to compel blood transfusion for 17-year-old leukemia patient over mother's and mi-
nor patient's religious objections, despite that patient would likely die within a month
without the treatment).
89. 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
90. Id. at 598. The Court simply affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit in a
one-sentence opinion, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). King
County Hosp., 390 U.S. at 598.
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care." 91 Finally, if the parent has offered no plausible reason for ob-
jecting to the treatment, courts will likewise order treatment. 2
By contrast, courts *have declined to authorize medical care over
parental objection where the child does not suffer from a life-threat-
ening, or potentially life-threatening, condition.93 Similarly, courts are
unwilling to compel medical treatment for minors over parents' reli-
gious or other objections when the proposed treatment is inherently
dangerous and invasive, or involves extreme pain and suffering that
overwhelm the benefits of treatment.94 Courts also tend to uphold
91. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Del. 1991); see, e.g., In re D.L.E.,
645 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1982) (finding that minor was neglected when mother ob-
jected to administration of medication to prevent epileptic seizures).
92. See Sher, supra note 28, at 188-89; see, e.g., In re Vasko, 263 N.Y.S. 552, 555
(App. Div. 1933) (permitting state intervention to compel treatment when parents
proffered arbitrary reasons for withholding consent); In re Rotkowitz, 25 N.Y.S.2d
624, 627-28 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941) (ordering surgery to correct polio-induced deformity
because father consistently failed to offer any explanation for refusing to consent).
93. See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 822-23 (N.Y. 1955) (refusing to compel
surgery on 14-year-old child with cleft palate and hair lip over father's objection to
surgery; father preferred "mental healing by letting 'the forces of the universe work
on the body' "); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972) (refusing to authorize
corrective spinal surgery on minor over mother's religious objection to blood transfu-
sion, stating that "as between a parent and the state, the state does not have an inter-
est of sufficient magnitude outweighing a parent's religious beliefs when the child's
life is not immediately imperiled by his physical condition" (emphasis omitted)). But
see In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 657-59 (Fam. Ct. 1970) (authorizing corrective
surgery for minor's facial and neck deformity where mother's religious objection was
only to blood transfusion; stating that "mother's religious beliefs" could not "stand in
the way of attaining through corrective surgery whatever chance [the child] may have
for a normal, happy existence"), aff'd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd, 278
N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972).
One commentator has characterized Green as an important "transitional" case in
the history of medical treatment cases. See Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision
Making For and By Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 311, 321. Even though the child ultimately adhered to his parent's wishes that
surgery not be performed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case so
that the views of the child whose health was at stake could be heard. In re Green, 307
A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. 1973). In this commentator's view, "Green may have sowed some
seeds for a subsequent movement toward permitting or seeking participation by mi-
nor children in decisions affecting their own health." Wadlington, supra, at 321. This
Note argues that competent minor children must have a voice in such cases affecting
their health, and that the most effective way of ensuring that children are heard is to
provide them with an independent advocate in the proceedings.
94. See, e.g., Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1118 (refusing to compel chemotherapy for
child with Burkitt's Lymphoma over Christian Scientist parents' objection because the
"proposed medical treatment was highly invasive, painful, involved terrible temporary
and potentially permanent side effects, posed an unacceptably low chance of success,
and a high risk that the treatment itself would cause his death"); In re Hudson, 126
P.2d 765, 768 (Wash. 1942) (refusing to compel amputation of 12-year-old girl's con-
genitally deformed left arm because mother feared risk of death posed by the sur-
gery); In re Green (Wis. Milwaukee County Ct. 1966), reprinted in Parental Right to
Refuse Medical Treatment for Child, 12 Crime & Delinq. 377, 384-85 (1966) (refusing
to find minor a neglected child when the mother, a Jehovah's Witness, failed to give
consent to treatment for sickle cell anemia, in part, because she was aware that the
proposed procedures were experimental, dangerous, and unlikely to be effective).
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parental discretion in medical treatment decisions when the proposed
procedure or treatment would provide no clear medical benefit to the
child.95 Finally, courts have declined to order treatment when such
treatment is "no more or less likely to benefit the child than the alter-
native course of action chosen" by the parents.
96
A more difficult question arises in predicting how courts would
treat parental objections to treatment based on fear of the financial or
emotional burdens posed by a seriously ill child.97 At least one com-
mentator argues that courts should not ignore such fears on the part
of parents. 98
95. Developments-Medical, supra note 87, at 1596; Robyn S. Shapiro & Richard
Barthel, Infant Care Review Committees: An Effective Approach to the Baby Doe
Dilemma?, 37 Hastings L.J. 827, 832 (1986); see, e.g., In re Guardianship of Barry, 445
So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding parental decision to terminate
life-support for terminally ill 10-month-old baby because child had no hope of ever
achieving awareness or normal brain functioning); Custody of a Minor, 434 N.E.2d
601, 604, 610 (Mass. 1982) (refusing to order treatment for four-and-a-half-month-old
abandoned child suffering from serious congenital heart malformation because pa-
tients with such a condition normally die within a year with or without treatment).
96. Developments-Medical, supra note 87, at 1596; see, e.g., Saratoga County
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 1979) (uphold-
ing parental decision to treat seven-year-old child with Hodgkins disease with nutri-
tional and metabolic therapy, instead of radiation and chemotherapy); Weber v. Stony
Brook Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 1983) (upholding parents' decision to
refuse surgery for their infant afflicted with spina bifida, microencephaly, and
hydrocephalus, stating that "the parents' choice of a course of conservative treatment,
instead of surgery, was well within accepted medical standards and [hence] ... there
was no medical reason to disturb the parents' decision"), aff'd, 456 N.E.2d 1186
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). But see Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836,
837-38 (Mass. 1979) (affirming lower court finding of neglect when parents refused to
consent to continued administration of chemotherapy treatment for their three-year-
old child suffering from lymphocytic leukemia, preferring, instead, metabolic
therapy).
In the Weber case discussed above, the parents withheld consent for corrective sur-
gery for their infant who was born with multiple congenital defects, choosing instead
another acceptable, but more conservative, form of treatment. 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
Although corrective surgery would have prolonged the child's life, it would not have
improved many of her handicaps. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 621
(1986) (summarizing facts from state court proceeding); see also Weber, 467 N.Y.S.2d
at 686 (stating that "[c]onsiderations of the risks of the surgical procedure, and its
impact upon the patient's overall medical condition, led both doctors to the conclu-
sion that the conservative course of treatment.., was medically appropriate"). The
federal government later sued the hospital for discriminatorily withholding medical
treatment for a handicapped person in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. See United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 609
(E.D.N.Y. 1983). Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the hospital had not dis-
criminated against the infant because the lack of parental consent justified the hospi-
tal's withholding of treatment. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 622. Although the Court did not
expressly uphold the parents' right to choose a reasonable alternative form of medical
care for their child, the dicta seemed to indicate the Court's approval of this
approach.
97. See Sher, supra note 28, at 190.
98. Id.
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Thus, while courts certainly defer to parental decision making in
some medical treatment cases out of respect for parental authority
and religious beliefs, the right of parents to withhold treatment for
their children is far from absolute. When courts overrule parental ob-
jections to treatment, however, they usually do so because ordering
treatment is in the best interests of the child, not out of deference to
the child's wishes.
To date, no reported cases exist where the minor has resisted the
proposed medical treatment consented to by the minor's parents.99
Because courts have, for the most part, accorded little or no weight to
the minor's preference in litigated medical treatment disputes, if the
parents of Billy Best, the sixteen-year-old Hodgkins disease patient,
had taken him to court to force him to undergo further chemother-
apy, 100 a judge would likely have ruled in favor of the parents. Legal
experts commenting on the case expressed doubt that such a case
would ever be litigated, or that anyone would ever compel a minor to
undergo treatment that she does not want.' 0 ' In at least one medical
treatment case where the court did take into account the views of the
minor in reaching its decision, however, language in the opinion
strongly suggested that the court would have deferred to the parents'
wishes if the parents had not agreed with the minor's decision to re-
fuse treatment. 10 2
D. Summary
The premium placed on a parent's right to decide what is best for
her minor child has served as justification for subordinating the legal
rights of the minor.'0 3 Deference to parental authority in medical
treatment decisions has unquestionably led courts to ignore, or accord
less weight to, the wishes of the child, thereby denying the child the
99. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that legal scholars know of no case in
which a U.S. court has ordered chemotherapy to be forced on an adolescent).
100. Id. (postulating a similar factual situation). Billy Best's parents eventually re-
lented, and allowed him to discontinue the therapy. Perkins, supra note 2, at BO.
Instead, he began a program of alternative medicine. Id. As of May 1995, Billy Best's
cancer was in remission. Id-
101. Knox, supra note 1, at 1, 19 (quoting Leonard Glantz and George Annas,
professors of health law at Boston University School of Law).
102. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (III. 1989) ("If a parent or guardian op-
poses an unemancipated mature minor's refusal to consent to treatment for a life-
threatening health problem, this opposition would weigh heavily against the minor's
right to refuse.").
103. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979) (arguing that "[l]egal restric-
tions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation
in a free society meaningful and rewarding"); see also Bruce C. Hafen, Children's
Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth
to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 605, 617 (discussing the "plenary" nature of
parental power, which "prevail[s] over the claims of the state, other outsiders, and the
children themselves unless there is some compelling justification for interference").
2090 [Vol. 64
MINORS IN MEDICAL DISPUTES
opportunity to make an important choice pertaining to the integrity of
her own body. Even in cases where the state's parens patriae power
has overridden parental authority, persuading courts to order neces-
sary treatment over parental objection, such decisions have not served
to promote a minor's fundamental right to make medical treatment
decisions on her own behalf because courts traditionally balance the
interests of the parents against those of the state only. Courts have, to
a limited extent, permitted minors to consent to treatment for them-
selves under mature minor statutes10 4 and in abortion and contracep-
tion cases,10 5 but this practice is not widespread in medical treatment
cases. Courts must extend the rights of minors even further, by recog-
nizing that they, too, have legal standing to enforce their right to par-
ticipate in medical treatment decision making.
I. MINORS SHOULD HAVE STANDING IN MEDICAL TREATMENT
CASES
In the past three decades, a noticeable trend toward greater recog-
nition of children's rights by federal and state courts has emerged.
The Supreme Court has stated that "[a] child, merely on account of
his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution."'1 6 The
Court has held that minors are entitled to constitutional protection in
a number of circumstances. The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law is appli-
cable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 7 Specifically,
minors in delinquency proceedings are entitled to adequate notice of
charges, 08 the assistance of counsel,10 9 the privilege against self-in-
crimination,1 0 and the right to confront their accusers."' Moreover,
minors in juvenile delinquency proceedings can be found guilty only
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt."12 Finally, the prohibition
against double jeopardy also applies to minors." 3
104. See infra notes 343-49 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 163-85 and accompanying text.
106. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633.
107. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967) (stating that, with respect to juvenile court
proceedings, "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the proce-
dural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process' ").
108. Id. at 33.
109. Id. at 41.
110. Id. at 55.
111. Id. at 57.
112. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
113. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 532-33 (1975) (holding that Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult after a finding in juvenile court that
he had violated a criminal statute). Despite the many due process protections en-
joyed by minors in the criminal context, the Court has placed limits on the extent of
such protection. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,545 (1971) (holding




Minors are entitled to constitutional due process protections in civil
contexts as well. For example, children may not be deprived of cer-
tain property interests without due process of law.114 Other constitu-
tionally protected civil rights and liberties that minors possess include
freedom of speech" 5 and equal protection against racial discrimina-
tion.116 Most recently, the Court has recognized a minor's constitu-
tionally protected right to use contraception" 7 and to have an.
abortion."' The Court's contraception and abortion decisions have
traditionally rested on the notion that privacy is a fundamental
right," '9 and that any infringement is, therefore, subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny.' The Court has, by implication, extended this funda-
mental right to minors as well in these limited contexts.' 2 '
114. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (stating that school-age child may
not be deprived of property interest in public school education without due process).
115. See Board of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (upholding reversal of grant
of summary judgment to defendants, stating that removal of books from school li-
brary violates students' First Amendment rights if by such removal defendants in-
tended to deny students access to ideas with which defendants disagreed); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding high
school students' right to wear black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War). But see
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) ("[W]e hold that educa-
tors do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.").
116. See Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). As in the criminal con-
text, the Court has also refused to grant minors civil rights and liberties to an extent
equal to that of adults. See, e.g., Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389,
2396 (1995) (holding that school policy of random urinalysis drug testing of students
who participate in the school's athletic programs does not violate students' Fourth
Amendment rights).
117. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977) (striking down
a New York statute prohibiting distribution of nonmedical contraceptives to persons
16 or over except through a licensed pharmacist, and entirely prohibiting their distri-
bution to persons under 16 years of age).
118. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (invalidating a Massachusetts
statute requiring parental consent or court order before an abortion can be performed
on an unmarried woman under the age of 18); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding that a state "may not impose a blanket provision...
requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion
of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy"); see also infra
notes 163-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reasoning in extending
the rights of contraception and abortion to minors).
119. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (stating that, despite the ab-
sence of explicit mention of privacy in the Constitution, "the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.s. 479, 484-85
(1965) (stating that an individual's right of privacy is found in the "penumbras" of
various Bill of Rights guarantees).
120. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are in-
volved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest,' . . . narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake." (citations omitted)).
121. Although the Court has extended the right of privacy to competent minors in
the contraception and abortion contexts, the Court has refused to recognize that a
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A. The Minor Must Have a Voice When a Protected Liberty
Interest Is at Stake
The wishes of the minor in medical treatment cases are rarely dis-
cussed, primarily because, other than in limited circumstances, 1' few
courts recognize that children have interests independent of those of
their parents or the state.'" When facing the possibility of undergo-
ing medical treatment against her wishes, or the possibility of being
denied medical treatment that she desires, the minor has fundamental
interests at stake. Theright of a competent individual to make deci-
sions affecting her own body is grounded in the common law rights of
informed consent and bodily integrity, and in the constitutional right
of privacy. 24 Given the recent judicial trend towards affording chil-
dren greater protection under the Constitution, a minor's right to
make medical decisions for herself should receive full protection, and
a minor should enjoy standing in contested medical treatment cases to
protect her rights of informed consent, bodily integrity and self-deter-
mination, and privacy.1
25
1. The Common Law Doctrine of Informed Consent
An individual has the right to make medical decisions on her own
behalf pursuant to the common law doctrine of informed consent.
126
Under this doctrine, a patient must receive information about all po-
tential benefits and attendant risks of treatment in order to.consent
minor's liberty interest outweighs parental rights in the civil commitment context. See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). The district court in Parham had held unconsti-
tutional Georgia's procedure for voluntary commitment of minors on the ground that
it did not adequately protect the due process rights of minors because it permitted
parents to commit their minor children without an adversary proceeding prior to or
after the commitment. Id- at 588. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision
of the district court, holding that parents "retain a substantial, if not the dominant,
role in the decision" to commit their child to a mental hospital, id- at 604, and that the
state's procedures for voluntary civil commitment were "reasonable and consistent
with constitutional guarantees." I& at 620.
122. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
123. Rodham, supra note 10, at 491-92; Sher, supra note 28, at 168-69.
124. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992) (privacy, which
derives from the "substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment
protects," limits a state's right to interfere with one's bodily integrity); Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-77 (1990) (surveying state court deci-
sions that have recognized that the right to refuse medical treatment derives from
common law, through the doctrine of informed consent and the right of bodily integ-
rity, or from the constitutional right of privacy); see also Skeels, supra note 54, at
1227-28 ("Most courts that have considered the constitutional issues involved in the
right to refuse medical treatment have based their decisions both on the right to pri-
vacy and the common law right to informed consent.").
125. See Rodham, supra note 10, at 509 (stating that, as minors are persons under
the Constitution, they are "entitled to the protective procedures of the Bill of Rights"
whenever their liberties or interests are adversely affected).
126. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
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effectively to that treatment. 2 7 If a physician performs the treatment
without having first obtained effective consent by the patient, the phy-
sician may be liable to the patient for battery at common law.'2 8 The
informed consent doctrine permits the individual to control her own
medical decisions and, thus, preserves the rights of bodily integrity
and self-determination.12 9
2. The Common Law Rights of Bodily Integrity and Self-
Determination
The common law rights of bodily integrity and self-determination
also support the contention that every individual has the right to make
her own treatment decisions.30 Courts, without question, recognize
the rights of bodily integrity and self-determination in adults. 131 The
Supreme Court stated in Union Pacific Railway Company v. Bot-
sford132 that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.' 1 33 In Botsford, the Court refused to order the plaintiff, who had
been injured while traveling on one of the defendant's trains, to sub-
mit to a surgical examination at the defendant's behest without her
consent.'34 The Court made clear that no court has the power to com-
pel an individual to accept unwanted medical attention. 3 5 The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its recognition of the right of bodily
integrity in more recent opinions. For example, in Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 36 the Court held that forced stomach pumping is "offensive to
human dignity."'1 37 Similarly, in Schmerber v. California,38 the Court
stated that "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
value of our society."'1 3 9 Although the Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly stated that minors enjoy a protected right of bodily integ-
127. Skeels, supra note 54, at 1204; see also Norman L. Cantor, Conroy, Best Inter-
ests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 543, 546 (1985) (stating
that "informed consent" entitles a patient "to be informed about and shape the course
of his medical treatment"). For a more thorough discussion of the doctrine of in-
formed consent, see infra notes 302-05, 381-89 and accompanying text.
128. Skeels, supra note 54, at 1204.
129. Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 863.
130. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (stating that value of bodily integrity is embodied
in the doctrine of informed consent, which is required for medical treatment).
131. Cantor, supra note 127, at 546; Skeels, supra note 54, at 1204.
132. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
133. Id. at 251.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 257.
136. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
137. Id. at 174.
138. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
139. Id. at 772.
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rity,14 ° several federal and state courts have specifically recognized
this right in minors, and have afforded it constitutional protection.' 4 '
3. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
The Supreme Court has not explicitly extended the right of bodily
integrity to minors. This subpart demonstrates, however, that the
Supreme Court has expressly extended privacy rights to minors in the
abortion and contraception contexts.142 The extension of privacy
rights in these controversial medical decisions implies a broader con-
viction that minors have a critical interest in most, if not all, medical
decisions that affect them.
Supreme Court precedent in the area of privacy recognizes that all
individuals, including minors, have the right to make medical treat-
ment decisions for themselves. In a series of cases involving chal-
lenges to state laws outlawing contraception and, abortion, the
Supreme Court, in striking down these laws, based its decisions on
constitutional grounds, holding that such laws infringe the individual's
140. The Supreme Court has, however, strongly hinted that a constitutionally pro-
tected right of bodily integrity exists in minors. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
673-74 (1977). In that case, the Court stated: "[W]here school authorities, acting
under color of state law, deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by re-
straining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, we hold that Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are implicated." Id. at 674.
141. For the most part, those federal and state courts that have specifically ac-
knowledged a minor's right of bodily integrity have done so in cases involving sexual
abuse of the minor by a state actor. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d
443, 450-51 (5th Cir.) (holding that school children have a liberty interest in their
bodily integrity that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that such liberty interest is violated when school child is sexually
abused by public school employee), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994); Black v. Indiana
Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 709 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that plaintiffs,
female school children who were allegedly sexually molested by their school bus
driver, have a liberty interest in their bodily integrity that is protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d
Cir. 1989) (stating that "the 'contours' of a student's right to bodily integrity[ ] under
the Due Process Clause[ ] ... encompass[es] a student's right to be free from sexual
assaults by his or her teachers"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); John Does 1, 2, 3
& 4 v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 884 F. Supp. 462, 466 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (following
Doe v. Taylor and recognizing that school children have a substantive due process
claim when they are sexually abused by a public school employee); Wilson v. Webb,
869 F. Supp. 496, 497 (W.D. Ky. 1994) ("Schoolchildren have a liberty interest in their
bodily integrity that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and physical sexual abuse by a school employee violates that right.").
Two state cases have specifically addressed a minor's right of bodily integrity in the
context of a medical procedure. See In re L., 632 A.2d 59, 62 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993)
(denying a putative father's motion to compel a 16-year-old homeless girl to submit to
a blood test to establish paternity, holding that in "[b]alancing [the minor's] constitu-
tional right to bodily integrity against the movant's tentative and attenuated status,
the former must obviously prevail"); Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836, 844 (Mass.
1979) (acknowledging minor's right of bodily integrity in determining whether parents
may refuse chemotherapy for their three-year-old child).
142. See infra notes 158-85 and accompanying text.
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fundamental right of privacy.'" Implicit in all of these cases is the
recognition of the common law rights of bodily integrity and personal
autonomy. 44
While most of the recent Supreme Court precedent in the area of
privacy and bodily integrity has involved abortion in particular, the
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to revisit the issues of privacy
and bodily integrity outside the abortion context. In Winston v.
Lee,'" for example, the Commonwealth of Virginia sought to compel
the respondent, who was a suspected armed robber, to undergo a sur-
gical procedure to remove a bullet lodged in his chest. 46 Although
the Court decided the case primarily on Fourth Amendment
grounds, 47 the Court refused to compel the surgery, in part, because
it "would be an 'extensive' intrusion on respondent's personal privacy
and bodily integrity."'" Similarly, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health,'49 the Court stated that "[t]he principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions."' 50 This statement is simply a reiteration that the constitu-
tional right of privacy is inherent in medical decision making. 5 '
Several recent decisions of lower federal courts also make clear that
no one can be forced to accept medical treatment against her wishes.
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Charters'52 stated:
The right to be free of unwanted physical invasions has been recog-
nized as an integral part of the individual's constitutional freedoms,
whether termed a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, or an aspect of the right to privacy contained in the notions
143. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing the right to seek
an abortion as inherent in the right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (holding that a state statute banning the use of contraceptives intrudes too
far into the constitutionally protected zone of privacy).
144. Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 851 & n.64; see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution places limits on a State's right to
interfere with a person's... bodily integrity." (citations omitted)); Roe, 410 U.S. at
153 (holding that the right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy and citing the "specific and direct harm" to physical
health potentially associated with an unwanted pregnancy); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488
(stating that privacy includes the freedom from bodily restraint) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
145. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
146. Id. at 755.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 764 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470
U.S. 753 (1985)).
149. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
150. Id. at 278 (emphasis added). The Court ultimately refused to allow the parents
of a woman in a permanent vegetative state to terminate her life support because the
parents had not offered clear and convincing evidence that such action reflected their
daughter's wishes. Id. at 285.
151. Skeels, supra note 54, at 1228.
152. 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
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of personal freedom which underwrote the Bill of Rights. The right
to refuse medical treatment has been specifically recognized as a
subject of constitutional protection. 53
Similarly, in Canterbury v. Spence,154 the D.C. Circuit stated that
"[t]he root premise is the concept, fundamental in American jurispru-
dence, that '[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body . ..155
Finally, the District of Rhode Island stated in Gray v. Romeo:
56
[T]he [Supreme] Court's decisions have repeatedly affirmed the
principle of individual self-determination. A person has the right,
subject to important state interests, to control fundamental medical
decisions that affect his or her own body. This right, whether de-
scribed as the principle of personal autonomy, the right of self-de-
termination, or the right of privacy, is properly grounded in the
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. This right is also grounded in the notion of an individual's
dignity and interest in bodily integrity.157
These decisions make clear that the constitutional right of privacy ex-
tends to a host of medical decisions beyond the choice to have an
abortion.
That minors also enjoy the fundamental right of privacy is apparent
from the Supreme Court's decisions in contraception and abortion
cases involving minors.' 58 The Court in Griswold v. Connecticut'59
and Roe v. Wade 160 did not expressly address the issue of a minor's
constitutional rights to procure contraception and to choose abor-
tion.' 6' In fact, in Roe, the Court "specifically reserved decision on
the question whether a requirement for consent.., by the parents, or
a parent, of an unmarried minor, may be constitutionally imposed.'
'1 62
The Court, however, squarely addressed these issues in subsequent
cases.
In Carey v. Population Services International,63 the Court invali-
dated a provision of a New York statute prohibiting the distribution of
nonmedical contraceptives to persons sixteen or over except through a
licensed pharmacist, and entirely prohibiting their distribution to per-
153. Id. at 491.
154. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
155. Id. at 780 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914)).
156. 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).
157. Id. at 585.
158. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
159. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67. Minors are not mentioned at all in Griswold.
162. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
163. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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sons under sixteen years of age."6 The Court held that "the right to
privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to
minors as well as to adults."' 65 The Court reiterated that state restric-
tions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve a
significant state interest.166 Thus, because the state of New York
failed to demonstrate a significant state interest justifying its blanket
prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives to minors, the Court
declared this portion of the statute unconstitutional. 67
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth68 and Bellotti v. Baird, 69 the
Court struck down state statutes that required unmarried females
under the age of eighteen to obtain parental consent before having an
abortion. 7 ° In Danforth, the Supreme Court announced that "the
State may not impose a blanket provision, such as... requiring the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abor-
tion of an unmarried minor. '1 7 1 Despite the Court's historical recog-
nition of the states' broader authority to regulate the activities of
children, 72 "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Mi-
nors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights.' 1 73 In Danforth, the Court found that the state
failed to further a significant interest' 74 in conditioning an abortion on
the minor's ability to obtain parental consent.' 75 This restriction, the
Court stated, did not advance the state's proffered interest of safe-
guarding the family unit and parental authority. 76 Most importantly,
the Court emphasized that.a parent's interest in her minor daughter's
164. Id. at 681-82.
165. Id. at 693.
166. Id. The articulated standard that must be met for the state to abridge a funda-
mental right of a minor is less stringent than the "compelling state interest" test ap-
plied when the state attempts to abridge a fundamental right of an adult. See Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that abridgement of fundamental right
of an adult is subject to strict judicial scrutiny). This difference reflects the concept,
that the state has greater authority to control the conduct of minors than it does to
control the conduct of adults. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
167. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694-96.
168. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
169. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
170. See id at 625-27, 647, 651 (declaring unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute
that required unmarried females under the age of 18 to obtain both parents' consent
or the consent of a superior court judge prior to seeking an abortion and holding that
the statute "impose[s] an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to
seek an abortion"); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (declaring unconstitutional a Missouri
statute requiring consent of a parent or guardian as a condition for abortion of an
unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy).
171. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
172. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
173. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
174. See supra note 166.
175. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
176. Id.
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abortion decision does not outweigh the competent, mature minor's
right of privacy.'77 The Court also pointed out that no other Missouri
statute specifically required consent of a minor's parent for medical or
surgical treatment, and that a minor may legally consent to services
for pregnancy (excluding abortion), venereal disease, and drug
abuse. 17  Thus, the Court held that, provided that the unmarried mi-
nor is " 'sufficiently mature to understand the procedure and to make
an intelligent assessment of her circumstances[,]' . . . the State does
not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute,
and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the [minor] to termi-
nate [her] pregnancy.'171
Similarly, in Bellotti v. Baird,8 0 even though the Massachusetts
abortion statute at issue provided the minor with an option to go to
the court if her parents refused to consent,' 8' the Court nonetheless
objected to the statute because it required the minor to go to her par-
ents before seeking relief from the court.'8 In the Court's view, a
third party should not have the power to veto a minor's decision to
have an abortion if she has demonstrated the maturity and ability to
make an intelligent choice on her own.'8 3 Accordingly, the Court
stated:
177. Id.
178. Id. at 73.
179. Id. at 74 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1376
(E.D. Mo. 1975) (Webster, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
180. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
181. Id. at 625.
182. Id. at 651.
183. Id. at 647. Even though parental consent cannot be required for an unmarried
female minor to exercise her right to procure an abortion, in some states, she may still
have to resort to the court before her consent is effective. For instance, in Bellotti,
even though the Supreme Court struck down the Massachusetts provision that re-
quired a pregnant minor to seek consent for an abortion from her parents first, the
Court upheld the portion that provided for judicial bypass, maintaining that the minor
must satisfy the court that she is mature enough to consent to an abortion for herself.
Id Since Bellotti, the Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of similar
judicial bypass provisions in other state abortion statutes. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (upholding constitutionality of Penn-
sylvania abortion statute requiring unemancipated pregnant minor to obtain consent
of at least one parent because statute also contained judicial bypass procedure); Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507-08, 510-11 (1990) (upholding
constitutionality of Ohio abortion statute requiring parental notification within 48
hours of performing the procedure or parental consent because statute also provided
for judicial bypass of the notification and consent requirements); Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 497 U.S. 417, 422-23, 427, 455 (1990) (holding constitutional a Minnesota abor-
tion statute requiring notice to both parents, if living, within 48 hours of performing
the procedure because the statute also provided for judicial bypass of the notice re-
quirement); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
490-92, 494 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of a Missouri abortion statute re-
quiring at least one parent's consent before an unemancipated pregnant minor may
undergo an abortion, but also providing for judicial bypass of the parental consent
requirement).
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We conclude.., that under state regulation such as that undertaken
by Massachusetts, every minor must have the opportunity-if she
so desires-to go directly to a court without first consulting or noti-
fying her parents. If she satisfies the court that she is mature and
well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on
her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental con-
sultation or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is com-
petent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted
to show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests.
If the court is persuaded that it is, the court must authorize the
abortion.'
8 4
The Court was sensitive to the fact that many young women do not
wish to inform their parents of their decision to have an abortion, and
that many parents who are informed might do everything in their
power to obstruct their child's access to the court.1
8 5
While the Supreme Court has not yet broadened the constitutional
right of privacy afforded to minors beyond contraception and abortion
cases, 8 6 one court views such an extension by the Supreme Court as
"inevitable."' 87 In the meantime, minors are not entirely without the
right to make medical treatment decisions on their own behalf. In
some states, mature minor statutes automatically give mature adoles-
cents the right to consent to certain medical procedures.188 In addi-
tion, state courts have, to a limited extent, solicited the minors's views
184. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48.
185. IdL at 647.
186. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 324 (ilM. 1989).
187. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 290 (III. App. Ct. 1987).
188. With mature minor statutes, theoretically, judicial intervention is not necessary
because the right to consent flows to the minor directly. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-8-4
(1990) (permitting any minor 14 years or older, or a high school graduate, or any
married, divorced, or pregnant minor to consent to legally authorized medical treat-
ment); Alaska Stat. § 25.20.025(a)(4) (1995) (allowing minors to consent to diagnosis,
prevention or treatment of pregnancy, and to consent to diagnosis or treatment of
venereal disease); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-132.01, 44-133.01 (1994) (allowing any
minor to consent to treatment for venereal disease and minors over 12 years of age to
consent to treatment for drug abuse); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-602(7) (Michie 1991)
(providing that "[a]ny unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to understand
and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or
procedures" may provide the necessary consent); Mll. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 410,
§§ 210/1, 210/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995) (permitting a minor under 18 who is
married or pregnant to validly consent to her own medical treatment and permitting a
minor 12 years or older to seek medical attention on her own if she believes she has
venereal disease or is an alcoholic or drug addict); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1095(A)
(West 1992) (providing that consent by "a minor who is or believes himself to be
afflicted with an illness or disease, shall be valid and binding as if the minor had
achieved his majority"); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 129.030(2) (Michie 1993) (stating that
a minor may consent who "understands the nature and purpose of the proposed ex-
amination or treatment and its probable outcome, and voluntarily requests it").
For a full discussion of the mature minor doctrine, see infra notes 343-61 and ac-
companying text.
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in litigated medical treatment cases.189 A few courts, sensitive to the
rights of the minor, have actually deferred to the minor's wishes in
such disputes. 190 Legislatures that permit minors to consent to treat-
ment for themselves and courts that have respected the wishes of the
minor in their decisions have played an invaluable role in establishing
precedent for promoting and protecting the right of a minor to partici-
pate in the medical decision-making process when her health and bod-
ily integrity are at stake. Nonetheless, minors still do not have
independent legal standing in medical treatment cases, and courts and
legislatures that do value the minor's viewpoint in medical decision
making constitute a minority.
B. Other Interests of the Minor
In addition to the fundamental rights of privacy and bodily integ-
rity, medical treatment cases implicate several other interests of mi-
nors that warrant recognition by courts. For instance, the minor has
an interest in preserving her own life. Thus, in cases where parents
refuse to consent to life-saving treatment, but the child wishes to un-
dergo the treatment, the minor herself should be able to challenge her
parents' decision. Granted, in such cases, some other party, such as
the state, usually has standing under a neglect statute to challenge a
parent's refusal to consent to necessary medical treatment.' 9' The na-
ture of the right to choose medical treatment, however, is so uniquely
personal that the minor herself must have legal standing to challenge
this decision. 9 Additionally, a minor has a right to a "normal" life in
non-life-threatening situations in which parents refuse to consent to
189. See, e.g., In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972) (stating that it would be
"anomalous" to ignore the minor's preference and remanding the case for an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine the minor's wishes).
190. See, e.g., E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323, 328 (upholding the right of a mature 17-year-
old Jehovah's Witness to refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds). In another
case from June of 1994, a court in Coral Springs, Florida ruled that a 15-year-old liver
transplant patient had the right to refuse to continue taking antirejection medicine
that caused him painful side effects. See Perkins, supra note 2, at B10. Similarly, in
1986, a Santa Clara County court permitted a 14-year-old Jehovah's Witness cancer
patient to refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds. See McKee, supra note 45,
at *3-4. But see In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 655 (Far. Ct. 1970) (refusing to
place the burden of deciding whether or not to undergo corrective surgery for a mas-
sive facial deformity on the child himself), aff'd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 1971),
aff'd, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972). The court, relying on Judge Fuld's dissent in In re
Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 824 (N.Y. 1955), stated:
This Court cannot evade the responsibility for [making] a decision now by
the simple expedient of foisting upon this boy the responsibility for making a
decision at some later day, which by the time it is made, if at all, will be too
late to undo the irreparable damage he will have suffered in the interim.
Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
191. See Sher, supra note 28, at 157-58.
192. See Wilber, supra note 9, at 351 (stating that "[t]he child's position is never
superfluous" and recommending that the court should hear the minor's wishes even if
they conform to the position held by another party).
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treatment to correct a disfigurement. 93 Finally, in cases where the
minor herself refuses treatment, regardless of whether her parents
agree with her, the minor's right of religious freedom,'94 and her wish
to be free of the extreme pain and discomfort associated with some
forms of medical treatment, 95 are at stake.
II. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING
CHILDREN
Part II demonstrates that minors have important fights and interests
at stake in litigated medical treatment disputes. Courts have recog-
nized in minors both the fights of privacy and of bodily integrity,
mainly in the abortion and contraception contexts. 96 Minors also
have the right to consent to certain forms of medical treatment under
mature minor statutes. 97 Furthermore, in a few medical treatment
cases, courts have been sympathetic to the wishes of minors. 98 Fi-
nally, minors in medical treatment cases have important interests wor-
thy of protection in addition to the fights of privacy and bodily
integrity, such as the right to preserve one's life and the right of reli-
gious freedom.'9 9 Accordingly, courts must grant the minor standing
to protect these important personal rights.
This part argues that giving the minor standing is only a necessary
first step. Once the minor becomes a party to a contested medical
treatment dispute, she must also have independent representation in
the form of an advocate. Currently, most states afford children the
right to representation in several noncriminal proceedings in which
their important interests are at stake, such as abuse and neglect pro-
193. See, e.g., Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (ordering corrective surgery for mi-
nor's deformity of face and neck over mother's objection, in part, because the court
was concerned with minor's chances for "a normal, happy existence, without a disfig-
urement so gross as to overshadow all else in his life").
194. In In re E.G., one of the most progressive decisions to date, the Illinois
Supreme Court deferred to the wishes of a mature 17-year-old Jehovah's Witness and
permitted her to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion. 549 N.E.2d at 327-28. The
court decided the case on common law grounds, however, holding that the mature
minor doctrine affords a mature minor in Illinois the right to refuse medical treat-
ment, and specifically declined to address the constitutional issue of the minor's right
to the free exercise of religion. Id.
195. See Perkins, supra note 2, at B10 (stating that the reason Billy Best refused
further chemotherapy treatment was because "he was sick and exhausted and said the
therapy was killing him").
196. See supra notes 158-85 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 188 and accompanying text; infra notes 343-49 and accompany-
ing text.
198. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
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ceedings, 200 parental rights termination cases,20 1 custody actions, 20 2
and others.20 1 Accordingly, the minor has a right to independent rep-
resentation in litigated medical treatment disputes as well.
Commentators argue that a minor has a right to counsel in any pro-
ceeding in which the minor has an interest.2°4 The proper role for the
attorney for minors, however, is the subject of intense debate.205 An
200. Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to Be Heard and Represented in Judi-
cial Proceedings, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 255, 268 (1991) (noting that almost every state
guarantees minors, by statute, the right to appointed counsel in abuse and neglect
proceedings); see, e.g., Cal. Weif. & Inst. Code § 317(c) (West Supp. 1996) (providing
for appointment of counsel for the minor in abuse and neglect cases when "it appears
to the court that the minor would benefit from the appointment of counsel"); Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 587-34(a) (Supp. 1992) ("The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for
the child to serve throughout the pendency of the child protective proceedings .... );
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(A) (West Supp. 1995) ("The court, in every
child protection proceeding... shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child."); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-586(a) (Supp. 1994) ("When in a petition a juvenile is alleged to be
abused or neglected, the judge shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent thejuvenile."); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6382(a) (1991) ("When a proceeding has been
initiated alleging child abuse, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the
child.").
201. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.235(1)(C) (West Supp. 1995) ("The court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for any child who is'the subject of a proceeding to termi-
nate parental rights .... ."); In re Orlando F., 351 N.E.2d 711, 717 (N.Y. 1976) (ex-
tending the right to a law guardian to children in termination of parental rights
proceedings in New York).
202. See Linda D. Elrod, Summary of the Year in Family Law, 27 Fain. L.Q. 485,
499 (1994) (stating that, in most states, judges have discretion to appoint a guardian
ad litem in custody cases); Jan Hoffman, When a Child-Client Disagrees with the Law-
yer, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1992, at B6 (stating that 27 states provide for appointment
of a lawyer or guardian to represent the rights of a minor in a custody dispute); see,
e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.24.310(a) (1995) (stating that "[i]n an action involving a ques-
tion of the custody, support, or visitation of a child, the court may... appoint an
attorney or the office of public advocacy to represent a minor with respect to the
custody, support, and visitation of the minor"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458.17-a(I)
(1992) ("In all proceedings for divorce, nullity, or legal separation, the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem, to represent the interests of the children of the marriage
...."); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.045(1)(a) (West 1993) (stating that the "[tlhe court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor child in any action affecting the family" if thd
court "has reason for special concern as to the welfare of a minor child" or the "legal
custody or physical placement of the child is contested").
203. See Genden, supra note 22, at 570-80 (noting that minors have been appointed
independent legal counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, civil commitment pro-
ceedings, custody actions, termination of parental rights actions, adoption hearings,
foster care cases, and paternity suits and recommending provision of independent
legal counsel for minors in parens patriae actions to compel medical treatment or
education).
204. See supra note 22. Other commentators recognize, however, that appointment
of counsel for minors threatens to undermine the interests of parents, by infringing on
their privacy and autonomy rights. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 109. This Note does
not argue that the other parties involved in the proceeding-the parents and the
state-should not have a voice in order that the court hear the minor's views. Rather,
the court must hear the minor's views in addition to those of the other parties so that
it can reach the best possible outcome.
205. See infra part III.B.
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examination of the role of counsel in our legal system in general, and
of the variety of roles played by attorneys for minors, reveals that the
traditional role of advocate is the only appropriate role in proceedings
where a competent minor's important rights are at stake.2 °6 Expres-
sion of the minor's wishes through an independent advocate is the
only way to ensure that the court will receive full information about
the minor's preferences.
A. The Role Played by Counsel When the Client Is an Adult
Individuals in our legal system have certain legal rights that often
need enforcement and protection. The role of the attorney in this sys-
tem is to assist litigants in the enforcement, protection, and preserva-
tion of their legal rights.2 °7 Consequently, "An attorney's purpose
and professional duty is to represent the interests of a client according
to that client's point of view. '20 8 The concepts of client control and
decision making constitute "the ideological bases of the adversary sys-
tem. '20 9 Allowing the client substantial control over decision making
in litigation bolsters the legal system's commitment to the vindication
of individual legal rights210 and promotes personal autonomy.21'
206. Regardless of the role the attorney for the child plays, serious practical issues
arise when a minor secures representation. For instance, who seeks out the child's
attorney? Who pays for the child's attorney? The fact that a medical treatment case
is a civil proceeding, however, suggests that there is no constitutional right to repre-
sentation, as is the case in juvenile.delinquency proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 41 (1967). Yet, state statutes provide for the appointment of attorneys or guardians
ad litem for minors in other civil proceedings. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.24.310(a)
(1995) (providing for appointment of guardian ad litem for minor in any action "in-
volving a question of the custody, support, or visitation of a child"); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 458:17-a(I) (Supp. 1995) (providing for appointment of a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of the children of the marriage in all proceedings for divorce,
nullity, or legal separation); N.Y. Faro. Ct. Act § 241 (McKinney Supp. 1996) (provid-
ing for appointment of a law guardian for all minors "who are the subject of family
court proceedings"); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 48.235, 767.045(1)(a) (West 1992 & Supp.
1995) (providing for appointment of guardian ad litem for minors in termination of
parental rights proceedings and in any proceeding "affecting the family"). A thor-
ough discussion of the. issues concerning how representation for the minor is attained
and who pays for such representation extends beyond the scope of this Note.
207. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 79.
208. Lyon, supra note 23, at 693.
209. Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client
Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue,
1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1003, 1003.
210. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 80-81.
211. Id. at 81-82. Professor Guggenheim states:
Allowing the client to control the litigation is consonant with our belief that
individuals should be allowed to make the important decisions about their
lives for themselves, even though the decisions they make may be unreason-
able or shortsighted. While an attorney may counsel his client against a par-
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The guidelines put forth by the American Bar Association, the or-
ganization responsible for shaping the ethical policies to which mem-
bers of the legal community in the United States are bound to adhere,
reflect the values of client control and autonomy in the litigation pro-
cess. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules") and Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code") require that an attorney present the position of the client to
the court.212 The Model Rules and Model Code also endorse the idea
that the client, not the attorney, has the ultimate authority to direct
the course of the litigation. 13 Finally, the Model Rules and Model
212. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules] (stating that an attorney, as advocate, "zealously asserts the client's position
under the rules of the adversary system"; Model Code of Professional Responsibility
EC 7-1 (1981) [hereinafter Model Code] (stating that the lawyer's duty is to "repre-
sent his client zealously within the bounds of the law" (footnote omitted)).
All states but California have adopted either the Model Rules or the Model Code.
See Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, 1996 Selected Standards on Profes-
sional Responsibility 133-37 (1996). California has formulated its own ethical stan-
dards, which comprise the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the
California Business and Professions Code. Id. at 282-344.
The ABA promulgated the Model Code in 1969, subsequently amending it every
year between 1974 and 1980. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 56-57(1986). In 1977, the ABA appointed a committee to revise the Code substantially,
addressing problems with the Code's practical applicability. IL at 60-61. The result
became the initial draft of what is now known as the Model Rules. Id. at 61. The
ABA adopted the Model Rules in 1983, replacing the Model Code, id at 62-63; how-
ever, many states continue to follow the Model Code rather than the Model Rules.
See id
The Model Rules consist of imperatives, cast in term of "shall" or "shall not," that
define the proper conduct for attorneys for purposes of discipline, as well as permis-
sive guidelines, cast in terms of "may," that permit attorneys a degree of discretion in
their conduct. See Model Rules, supra, Scope. The Model Code comprises Canons,
Ethical Considerations ("ECs"), and Disciplinary Rules ("DRs"). See Model Code,
supra, Preliminary Statement. According to the Model Code Preliminary Statement
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their rela-
tionships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.
They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations
and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive....
The Disciplinary Rules ... are mandatory in character. [They] state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being sub-
ject to disciplinary action.
I&.
Attorneys have a strong incentive to abide by the mandates of the Model Rules and
the Model Code because violation of an ethical rule exposes an attorney to discipli-
nary action ranging from reprimand to disbarment. See Wolfram, supra, at 95, 118.
213. Model Rules, supra note 212, Rule 1.2(a) (providing that "[a] lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.., and shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued"); Model
Code, supra note 212, EC 7-7 ("[T]he authority to make decisions is exclusively that
of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding
on his lawyer."). These ethical guidelines appear to apply mainly to decisions affect-
ing the merits of the case or implicating the client's substantive legal rights. See id.
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Code require a lawyer to provide information to the client to keep her
fully informed of developments in the case 214 and to present such in-
formation in a manner that permits the client to make reasoned, in-
formed decisions.215
The ABA ethics rules, which define the "normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship," are "based on the assumption that the client, when properly
advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important
matters. 2 16 Thus, the ethical norms that govern attorneys' conduct
clearly reflect a deep respect for the individual's right to make impor-
tant decisions for herself and to control her own life.
B. The Traditional Roles Attorneys for Children Play
Legal counsel for minors usually falls into two formal categories:
guardians ad litem and attorneys.217 Typically, a guardian ad litem ad-
vocates the child's best interests while an attorney advocates the
child's expressed wishes.218 Very few states, however, clearly differen-
tiate between the two.219 In particular, there is often confusion as to
the guardian ad litem's function. Some jurisdictions require the guard-
ian ad litem to advise or make recommendations to the court regard-
ing the child's best interests, rather than to act as an attorney for any
("In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or sub-
stantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on
his own."). Courts and commentators apparently divide on this issue:
At least some courts have held that, while the client has broad control
over the subject matter of the case, tactics and procedure may be chosen by
the attorney without client involvement .... Other commentators and
courts, however, have asserted that the client has ultimate authority to in-
struct the attorney on any and all phases of their relationship ....
Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 80 n.13.
214. Model Rules, supra note 212, Rule 1.4(a) (stating that "[a] lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information"); Model Code, supra note 212, EC 9-2 (requir-
ing a lawyer to "fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the
matters being handled for the client").
215. Model Rules, supra note 212, Rule 1.4(b) (providing that "[a] lawyer shall ex-
plain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make in-
formed decisions regarding the representation"); Model Code, supra note 212, EC 7-8
(requiring a lawyer to "exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations"). The Model
Rules and Model Code do recognize, however, that when the client is a minor, fully
informing the client of all relevant considerations may not be desirable. See Model
Rules, supra note 212, Rule 1.4 cmt. (stating that "fully informing the client according
to [the] standard [of Rule 1.4] may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a
child"); Model Code, supra note 212, EC 7-11 (recognizing that "[t]he responsibilities
of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or
age of a client").
216. Model'Rules, supra note 212, Rule 1.14 & cmt.
217. Haralambie, supra note 22, at 2.
218. Id. at 14.
219. Id. at 2.
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particular party.22 Other jurisdictions treat the guardian ad litem as
an attorney for a party, with the exception that the guardian deter-
mines the position to be advocated before the court rather than the
client.22' Thus, because there is confusion as to what function an at-
torney or a guardian ad litem for a minor should play, counsel for
children generally adopt one of the three traditional functional roles,
which include the neutral investigator, the "champion," and the tradi-
tional advocate. 222 An examination of the functional roles played by
counsel for minors may prove more useful than labels such as "guard-
ian ad litem" and "attorney" in elucidating what it means to represent
a child.2'
1. Neutral Investigator
One suggested role for the minor's attorney is that of neutral inves-
tigator. The neutral investigator does not advocate a particular posi-
tion before the court.224 Rather, she uncovers the facts and the legal
issues involved in the case and then presents them to the court in a
neutral manner.225 Because litigation is traditionally adversarial in na-
ture, the neutral investigator plays an important part in ensuring that
all possible relevant information is brought to the court's attention in
the proceeding, enabling the court to make an accurate assessment of
which outcome will best serve the child.226 In essence, the neutral in-
vestigator "fills the gaps left by other parties." 7
220. Id at 10.
221. Id. at 10-11.
222. See Lurie, supra note 22, at 207-11. Some state legislatures have fashioned a
fourth functional role for the minor's attorney-that of law guardian. Id at 207-11.
The law guardian may perform a dual role: as advocate, she is charged with repre-
senting the minor's wishes; as guardian, she must represent the minor's best interests.
Id. at 211; see, e.g., N.Y. Far. Ct. Act § 241 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996) (establish-
ing a system for appointment of law guardians for minors in family court proceedings
who may require the assistance of counsel to help protect their best interests and to
help them express their wishes to the court). Critics of the hybrid approach believe
that an attorney who serves as both advocate and guardian faces an inherent conflict
of interest. Lurie, supra note 22, at 229. For example, in In re Dobson, the Supreme
Court of Vermont stated that "a lawyer attempting to function as both guardian ad
litem and legal counsel is cast in the quandary of acting as both attorney and client, to
the detriment of both capacities and the possible jeopardizing of the infant's inter-
ests." 212 A.2d 620, 622 (Vt. 1965).
223. See Haralambie, supra note 22, at 2-3.
224. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 107.
225. Id.; Lyon, supra note 23, at 690.
226. See Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 109. For example, according to one state
statute, the neutral investigator's role in a custody proceeding is to "make such inves-
tigation as will enable [her] to ascertain all facts and circumstances that will affect the
rights and interests of the children and will enable the court to enter just and proper
orders and judgment concerning the care, custody and maintenance of the children."
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.090(3) (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994).
227. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 107.
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Despite the allure of the neutral investigator role for the child's at-
torney, it poses several problems. The neutral role of fact finder nec-
essarily conflicts with an attorney's obligation as an advocate to
represent her client zealously." 8 Furthermore, because neutral inves-
tigators engage in such extensive pretrial discovery, on which courts
will likely heavily rely, their efforts threaten to usurp the fact finder's
traditional role in the adversarial process.1 9 The neutral investigator
may also present to the court findings that are not truly neutral if, for
example, her findings reflect her own personal position on the mat-
ter. 3 ° When this occurs, the investigator imposes her own views on
the court, contrary to her appointed role. Moreover, if the child has
no advocate speaking for her, she has no mechanism by which to chal-
lenge the fact finder's facts 31 In the words of Professor Guggenheim,
"When courts and commentators propose that children be given In-
vestigators, they are really proposing a new form of court-ordered dis-
covery; they are not, however, increasing the legal representation of
young children by one iota."232
2. "Champion"
The "champion"233 represents yet another role often played by the
minor's attorney. The champion's function demands that she argue-to
the court her own conception of what is in the best interests of the
228. Model Rules, supra note 212, Preamble; Model Code, supra note 212, EC 7-1.
Some judges, however, suggest that the client of the neutral investigator is the court,
not the child. See Haralambie, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that some judges view the
attorney's primary obligation as "advising the court, not the child"). Proponents of
this view, therefore, would regard the neutral investigator's role as entirely consistent
with the obligation imposed upon lawyers by the Model Rules and the Model Code.
229. See Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 108. Professor Guggenheim, for example,
writes that:
Since it is likely that the fact finder will base its decision largely on the re-
sults of the Investigator's pretrial investigations, very real danger exists that
the case will already have been decided before it comes to trial.... [S]uch a
transformation in the structure of litigation would represent a shift in effec-
tive decisionmaking power from the fact finder to the Investigator.
IL
230. Id. (stating that the information may be "colored by the Investigator's values,
by [her] sense of what is relevant and what is not, before it is ever heard in open
court"). Another commentator states:
[A] 'neutral factfinder' may be worse than no attorney at all. While the
factfinder's job is to present objective information to the court, the informa-
tion he chooses to present and that which he chooses not to present will
reflect his biases and values. Thus, what comes to the court in the guise of
facts may actually be subjective information.
Wilber, supra note 9, at 355-56.
231. Wilber, supra note 9, at 356.
232. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 108.
233. See id. at 100 & n.114 (identifying the origin of this term in the child client
context). Professor Guggenheim notes that the term "champion" was first coined by
Justice Brennan in his dissent in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 638 (1979).
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child.'- 4 The champion role is most consistent with the traditional
conception of the guardian ad litem appointed by the court.
235
Commentators have also extensively criticized the champion role
for the minor's attorney. First, the assumption that an attorney is
more capable of identifying a child's best interests than the child her-
self deprives the child of a voice.-36 Second, the champion "contra-
venes the traditional prohibition against lawyers expressing their
personal views to the factfinder.' '- 7 The adversarial system usually
disregards an attorney's personal views concerning the case.3 8 Third,
providing the minor client with a champion adds an element of redun-
dancy to the proceeding. Because in many cases involving children
the parties can take only a limited number of positions, often the
champion adopts a position that another party already advocates, re-
sulting in a duplication of effort 3 9 Fourth, the champion often simply
relies on the recommendation of the social worker or other profes-
sional involved in the case.-4 The judge, in turn, may be tempted to
rely disproportionately on the champion's judgment.24 1 Thus, in ef-
fect, the champion decides the case, usurping the role of the judge.' 4
Finally, critics argue that for every champion who argues a particular
position, many others would argue the opposite; consequently, the
champion adds a degree of arbitrariness to the process.
43
3. Advocate
The third possible role for the minor's attorney is the traditional
role of advocate. The function of the advocate is to argue the express
wishes of the child.'" This role for the minor's attorney comports
with that played by attorneys generally in our legal system. Such an
approach conforms with the Model Rules and the Model Code, which
require that an attorney represent her client's position zealously, 45
234. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 100; Lyon, supra note 23, at 691.
235. Haralambie, supra note 22, at 26; Wilber, supra note 9, at 356; see also supra
note 218 and accompanying text (defining the role of the guardian ad litem).
236. Wilber, supra note 9, at 356.
237. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 101; Wilber, supra note 9, at 356.
238. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 102. In fact, the Model Code provides:
The expression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant,
or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not a proper subject for
argument to the trier of fact.
Model Code, supra note 212, EC 7-24; see also Model Rules, supra note 212, Rule
3.4(e) (stating that a lawyer shall not state a personal opinion as to the above-noted
subjects).
239. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 103-04.
240., See Wilber, supra note 9, at 356.
241. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 106.
242. Id
243. Id.
244. Lyon, supra note 23, at 692.
245. Model Rules, supra note 212, Preamble; Model Code, supra note 212, EC 7-1.
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and that an attorney for a minor, specifically, "shall, as far as reason-
ably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client." 46 Several scholars argue that this function is the only legiti-
mate role for the minor's attorney. 47 Courts, too, have expressed
support for this role.248 Despite the potential challenges this model
poses for the child's attorney,249 the courts,250 and the other interested
parties," 1 providing the minor in a medical treatment case with an
attorney who will advocate the child's own expressed desire or opin-
ion is the only workable alternative.2 52
C. The Competent Minor Must Have Access to an Independent
Advocate in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes
Competent minors in litigated medical treatment disputes have sig-
nificant personal rights and interests at stake, including the rights of
informed consent, bodily integrity, and privacy. Courts in such cases
must recognize that the competent minor has standing to protect these
rights and interests. Additionally, once the court has recognized the
minor as a party with standing, the minor must have access to an at-
torney to represent her interests, and this attorney must fulfill the role
of advocate to represent the position of the minor in the proceeding
effectively. Because competent children have a right to contribute to
medical treatment decisions that concern them, and because courts
246. Model Rules, supra note 212, Rule 1.14(a). No comparable provision in the
Model Code exists specifically advising the lawyer how to handle clients who are mi-
nors. See id. Rule 1.14(a) cmt. Model Code EC 7-11 provides that the "responsibili-
ties of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condition
or age of a client," and Model Code EC 7-12 states that "[a]ny mental or physical
condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered judgment on
his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer." Model Code, supra
note 212, ECs 7-11 to 7-12.
247. Lyon, supra note 23, at 692; see, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 78, 82-93
(arguing that children over the age of seven ought to have the power to direct their
attorneys in delinquency and other types of legal proceedings that affect them); Wal-
lace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of
a Standard, 16 J. Fam. L. 1, 15-16 (1977-78) (asserting that attorneys in custody and
visitation disputes should attempt to effectuate the child's wishes and treat their rela-
tionships with child clients from the traditional attorney-client perspective); Wilber,
supra note 9, at 353-54 (stating that the same principles that apply when the client is
an adult should apply when the child is a minor).
248. See, e.g., Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382 (Alaska 1977). In a case involving a
custody proceeding, the court stated:
[W]hen a child needs [an independent representative], he needs an advo-
cate-someone who will plead his cause as forcefully as the attorneys for
each competing [party] plead theirs. The basic premise of the adversary sys-
tem is that the best decision will be reached if each interested person has his
case presented by counsel of unquestionably undivided loyalty.
IL at 390.
249. See infra notes 280, 286-87 and accompanying text.
250. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 291, 293-94 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 253-74 and accompanying text.
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sometimes take their views into consideration anyway, minors should
be able to express those views formally through an advocate.
The advocate role for the child's attorney, of course, has both bene-
fits and drawbacks. Several arguments support the advocate role for
the minor's attorney. First, this role respects' the autonomy of minors
and protects their right to make certain decisions for themselves.5 3
As shown in part II, a minor clearly has significant interests at stake
when others attempt to make medical decisions for her without her
agreement. Once the court has recognized that the minor has stand-
ing to challenge those decisions, she must have an advocate to assist
her in protecting her rights of informed consent, bodily integrity, and
privacy. Further, when the attorney advocates the child's wishes, the
minor feels as if she has participated in the decision-making process,
empowering the minor and diminishing her sense of alienation. 54 As
one commentator points out: "In the best of circumstances, litigation
can be intimidating and confusing to a child. The experience may be
worse when the child feels totally powerless and has no meaningful
input."' 25 An outcome that is adverse to the minor's wishes is easier
to accept if the minor has a sense that someone has "gone to bat" for
her and that the court has heard her views. 256 To deprive minors of a
voice in proceedings in which they have an interest is fundamentally
unfair, and fairness is essential to raising children who become respon-
sible, self-respecting citizens.257
Second, the role of advocate for the minor's attorney is consistent
with the ethical mandates of the Model Rules and the Model Code. 58
This role, moreover, comports with that recommended by the Institute
of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association's Joint
Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards ("IJA-ABA Standards"). 259
The IJA-ABA Standards expressly reject the "best interests" ap-
253. See Federle, supra note 23, at 1563 (discussing the "empowering effect" of pro-
viding independent representation for minors in the form of an advocate in custody
proceedings); Haralambie, supra note 22, at 34 (stating that when a child is verbal and
mature, the "child has a right to place his or her position before the court for
consideration"). a
254. Wilber, supra note 9, at 355.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Lyon, supra note 23, at 686 (citing Henry H. Foster, Jr., A "Bill of Rights" for
Children at xi (1974)). The Bill of Rights for Children states: "The idea of fairness is
part of the fabric of the doctrine of justice, and the sense of what's fair and unfair
emerges in childhood.... [C]hildren must be treated fairly if we want them to mature
into responsible adulthood." Foster, supra, at xi.
258. See supra notes 212-16, 245-46 and accompanying text.
259. The IJA-ABA Standards "are intended to serve as guidelines for action by
legislators, judges, administrators, public and private agencies, local civic groups, and
others responsible for or concerned with the treatment of youths at local, state, and
federal levels." IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 22, Preface at v. Unlike the Model
Rules and Model Code, the IJA-ABA Standards do not have the force of law and,
therefore, violation of any Standard will not subject an attorney to disciplinary action.
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proach to the representation of children, urging, instead, advocacy of
the minor's expressed preferences. 260 Excepting only very young chil-
dren, the IJA-ABA Standards suggest that, in general, determination
of the juvenile client's interests in delinquency proceedings, in need of
supervision proceedings, and protective proceedings, remains the re-
sponsibility of the client and that the attorney be bound by the client's
determination.26'
Third, the advocate role is consistent with the adversarial model of
the U.S. legal system.262 Under this system, the trier of fact reaches
the appropriate decision after hearing all sides of the issue as
presented by the parties in interest.263 The judge or the jury can reach
the optimal outcome in the case only through zealous advocacy on
behalf of each party in interest, which presents all the relevant facts
and legal issues. Legal proceedings involving minors require such
zealous advocacy to an equal degree: "The parents and the state are
represented by counsel who vigorously defend their clients' positions.
Failure to advocate the child's wishes undermines the court's ability to
determine a just result."2" When the child's position differs from that
of her parents, the child requires an independent advocate to inform
the court of her position.265 Even if some other party presents the
same position as the child, the court still must be aware of the child's
express wishes. 266 Undoubtedly, the other parties-the parents and
the state-present the issues from their own perspectives, slanting
them to reflect their own interests.2 67 Because neither the parents nor
the state will present an unbiased view of the minor's position, 6 the
minor's attorney must do that for her.
Finally, parents do not always make the best decisions for their chil-
dren,269 and do not always have their child's best interests as their
exclusive consideration." For example, when the family views the
minor's need for medical treatment as presenting a great burden to
the family, both emotionally and financially, the parents' decision re-
garding treatment may not be objective.271 Such a situation presents
260. Haralambie, supra note 22, at 30.
261. HIA-ABA Standards, supra note 22, § 3.1(b).
262. Wilber, supra note 9, at 354; Lyon, supra note 23, at 686.
263. Wilber, supra note 9, at 354; Lyon, supra note 23, at 686.
264. Wilber, supra note 9, at 355.
265. Id. at 351.
266. Id.
267. Lyon, supra note 23, at 686.
268. Id.
269. Abigail L. Kuzma, The Legislative Response to Infant Doe, 59 Ind. L.J. 377,
382 (1984); see also Lyon, supra note 23, at 684-85 (stating that the presumption that
parents will make the best decision for their child is rebuttable).
270. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 1819, 1846 (1996) (noting the "inherent conflict" between parents
and child in custody, abuse or neglect, and termination of parental rights cases).
271. Kuzma, supra note 269, at 382.
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"an obvious conflict of interest" between the parents and the child.272
In addition, the parents themselves may disagree over a proposed
course of medical treatment for their child.2 73 As a solution to this
problem, one commentator argues that if the minor is competent, the
minor's decision regarding the proposed treatment should govern.274
Despite the many good reasons offered in support of the advocate
role for the child attorney, other commentators raise countervailing
arguments. For example, one commentator argues that retaining in-
dependent counsel for the child invariably results in duplication of ef-
fort.2 7 5 Because the positions of the parents and the state are already
represented, the advocate for the child does not add another meaning-
ful perspective to the proceeding.2 76 This argument, however, reduces
a complex proceeding to only two possible outcomes: the one advo-
cated by the parents and the one advocated by the state.277 The
child's position may, in fact, differ from that of both her parents and
the state.278 Even if the child's position comports with that of another
represented party, the motivation underlying her position may differ
substantially.279
An additional problem stems from the minor's possible lack of com-
petence. A minor's difficulty in comprehending the significance of
certain issues and in communicating her views makes it difficult for
her to direct her attorney s0 Others argue, however, that the legal
community underestimates the ability of many minors to make "con-
sidered judgments."'" Some commentators maintain that many
272. Id.
273. Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 868 & n.166; see, e.g., In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d
3, 4 (Ga. 1992) (considering the case of an unconscious 13-year-old child suffering
from a neurological degenerative disorder whose parents disagreed over the decision
whether to consent to issuance of a "do not resuscitate" order); Curran v. Bosze, 566
N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (l. 1990) (confronting the issue of whether two minor twins could
be compelled to donate bone marrow for the benefit of their dying half brother where
the twins' father consented to the procedure but their mother did not); Soloveichik v.
Soloveichik, No. 89 CH 215 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 1989) (considering the case of a 12-
year-old boy with a brain tumor whose parents could not agree on the appropriate
form of therapy), cited in Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 846-48 & nn.25-41.
274. Feigenbaum, supra note 6, at 871.
275. Wilber, supra note 9, at 350.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 350-51.
278. Genden, supra note 22, at 580.
279. Wilber, supra note 9, at 350-51. For example, the motivation underlying the
minor's position might differ from that of both the state and her parents in a state-
initiated proceeding to compel chemotherapy for a minor over parental objection.
Clearly, the state wants to compel treatment to save or prolong the minor's life. The
parents might object to treatment for religions reasons. The minor, too, might object
to treatment, not on religious grounds, but rather because she does not wish to un-
dergo painful therapy that has potentially devastating side effects.
280. See Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 93-94; Ventrell, supra note 10, at 275-76.




adults possess no greater ability to make rational decisions than do
children.282 In fact, adult litigants often make irrational decisions, a
reality that attorneys must cope with on a daily basis, yet this fact does
not mean that such clients should lack control over the course of their
own litigation.283 In any event, that the child possesses the requisite
competence to consent to treatment on her own behalf, and to direct
her attorney if a dispute concerning treatment is litigated, constitutes
an essential component of the model presented in this Note and will
be discussed in greater detail in the next part.' 4 Many, if not most,
minors possess the requisite competence for this proposed model to
work effectively. The minor who can articulate her views, but who
may be reluctant to open up to her attorney because she is distrustful
of adults, poses a more serious problem .2 8 5 If the attorney can con-
vince her client to communicate her wishes, the minor will benefit
from the assistance of an advocate in court because the distrustful mi-
nor may not be likely to express her views freely to her parents, an-
other party to the proceeding, or the court of her own accord.
The attorney for the child may also face a difficult situation when
the minor client insists that her attorney advocate a position that is
clearly contrary to the minor's best interests. s6 Ideally, the attorney
is ethically bound to follow the client's directive even if she believes
the client's position to be unwise. 287 As a possible solution to this
dilemma, the attorney can assume her role as advisor to persuade the
minor client to reconsider her opinion.288 The attorney can reason
with her client, explain why the client proposes a bad decision, and
offer better alternatives,2 89 without usurping the decision-making
function. In at least one jurisdiction, the attorney may seek to with-
draw in extreme circumstances when the minor's position advances a
282. See, e.g., Wilber, supra note 9, at 354 ("Many children, particularly adoles-
cents, are as capable of rational decisioni making as adult litigants."); see also Wallace
J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 1873, 1881-83 & nn.37-54 (1996) (citing studies demonstrating that
adolescent decision making does not differ significantly from adult decision making).
283. Wilber, supra note 9, at 354.
284. See infra part IV.
285. Ventrell, supra note 10, at 276.
286. Id. at 278.
287. See Model Code, supra note 212, ECs 7-7 to 7-8 (stating that "the authority to
make decisions is exclusively that of the client and... such decisions are binding on
his lawyer," and that only in a "non-adjudicatory matter" may an attorney withdraw if
the client "insists upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and ad-
vice of the lawyer"); HIA-ABA Standards, supra note 22, § 3.1(b) commentary
("Although counsel may strongly feel that the client's choice of posture is unwise,....
the lawyer's view may not be substituted for that of a client who is capable of consid-
ered judgment .... ").
288. Ventrell, supra note 10, at 279.
289. Id.
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course of action so inappropriate that the attorney cannot, in good
conscience, argue it to the court.290
Critics also claim that providing the minor with an advocate in-
fringes on the interests of the other parties to the proceeding. For
instance, this arrangement may undermine the parents' authority and
autonomy in making decisions concerning their children.291 Nonethe-
less, "There are better means for protecting parental autonomy than
silencing children.' '292 Likewise, an advocate for a minor may poten-
tially interfere with the state's duty as parens patriae to act as guardian
for those members of society who are incapable of caring for them-
selves.293 Nevertheless, the court must hear the voice of the most in-
terested party in the proceeding-the minor. Including the voice of
the minor does not mean excluding those of the other interested
parties.
Finally, having an attorney who represents the minor's wishes may
potentially harm the integrity and unity of families.294 If the child and
the parent, however, desire the same outcome (e.g., no treatment),
then the state becomes the party who interferes in the family relation-
ship. In fact, intrusion by the state in any situation may potentially
create dissent among family members. Thus, this argument only has
validity in cases where the views of the minor and her parents differ.
Although the advocate model poses some serious drawbacks, its
benefits outweigh its disadvantages. Most importantly, the advocate
model protects a minor's fundamental rights and interests when some
other party-either the minor's parents or the state-attempts to ex-
clude the minor from the treatment decision making-process.
IV. COMPETENCE As A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE
Thus far, this Note demonstrates that courts must afford minors
standing in litigated medical treatment disputes to protect their rights
of informed consent, bodily integrity, and privacy. In addition, this
Note shows that the most effective means by which to protect the mi-
nor's rights in court is to provide her with an attorney who functions
as her advocate, communicating the minor's views to the court. This
model operates effectively only when the minor is competent.295 This
290. See Massachusetts Bar Association, Opinions of the Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics, Op. No. 93-6, in 78 Mass. L. Rev. 153, 154 (1993).
291. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 77; Wilber, supra note 9, at 351; see also supra
part L.A (discussing the parental rights and interests implicated in proceedings involv-
ing their children).
292. Wilber, supra note 9, at 352.
293. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
294. Wilber, supra note 9, at 355 (stating that "one can convincingly question the
wisdom of adversarial dispute resolution in cases involving children or families").
295. This model does not work for incompetent minors primarily because incompe-
tent children are not capable of making decisions for themselves, nor can they com-
municate their wishes to an attorney. Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 93-94. Several
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part demonstrates why competence is essential and will review some
of the means by which to assess competence in minors. This part con-
cludes that a rebuttable presumption of competence presents the most
logical and efficient means of assessing the competence of minors.
A widely held and firmly rooted principle in the American legal
tradition is that capacity constitutes a necessary prerequisite to the
assertion of legal rights.296 This view originated in the theories of the
commentators have offered suggestions as to how to represent incompetent children
in proceedings where their interests are affected. In the medical treatment decision-
making arena, however, these proposals are inadequate. The UA-ABA Standards
suggest the appointment of a guardian ad litem in addition to an advocate in proceed-
ings involving incompetent minors. IJA-ABA Standards, supra note 22,
§ 3.1(b)(ii)[c][2]. According to this approach, the minor's attorney advocates on be-
half of her client the views espoused by the guardian. See id § 3.1(b) commentary.
While this approach would permit the minor's attorney to maintain the position of
advocate, Lurie, supra note 22, at 234, the minor's rights are not vindicated. Rather,
the attorney simply argues to the court some third party's conception of what is best
for the minor. The court is, thus, deprived of the benefit of the minor's views in
making its ultimate decision concerning whether to order treatment. If someone
other than the minor herself is going to make the treatment decision, that person
ought to be the minor's parent or guardian, whose views presumably are already rep-
resented in the proceeding.
Another possible solution to the problem posed by incompetent children in medical
treatment cases is for the attorney to determine the view of her incompetent client
through the doctrine of substituted judgment. W'ilber, supra note 9, at 359; Lurie,
supra note 22, at 234; Lyon, supra note 23, at 702. Using the doctrine of substituted
judgment, the attorney attempts to determine what her client's wishes would be were
the client capable of comprehending the situation and expressing her views. Id. In
formulating the client's position, the attorney may determine the incompetent minor's
intent by examining the minor's habits, attachments, values, and personality, asking
the minor what treatment outcome she desires now, seeking the opinion of informed
individuals (e.g., her parents, her physician, or her psychologist) as to what the minor
will desire in the future, or striving to identify what a reasonable, similarly situated
child of the client's age would want. Wilber, supra note 9, at 362-63; Lyon, supra note
23, at 703. Some courts and commentators believe that the incompetent person's free
choice and dignity are protected through use of the substituted judgment method in
medical treatment cases. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 52, at 86 (citing Custody of a
Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (Mass. 1978) and Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 n.15 (Mass. 1977)). This may be the case with
incompetent adults, who may have been capable of expressing their views on the mat-
ter at some time in their lives. Very young children, however, have never been com-
petent to express a viewpoint from which the attorney can formulate a position.
Haralambie, supra note 22, at 7. Consequently, there is substantial risk that the in-
competent minor's attorney will substitute the minor's view with her own judgment.
Wilber, supra note 9, at 363; Lyon, supra note 23, at 705. Merely substituting the
position of the minor with that of the minor's attorney defeats the purpose of afford-
ing the minor standing and independent representation in the first place-to protect
the right of the minor herself to participate in making important medical decisions
that directly affect her.
296. Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A
Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983, 987 (1993).
An important related issue concerns who decides whether the child is competent. In
the medical treatment context, three possibilities exist-the minor's physician, the
minor's attorney, or the court. Some commentators argue that the minor's attorney
should assess competence because she normally has the most contact with the client
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seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers who exerted such a
strong impact on this nation's Founding Fathers.297 Children's rights
theorists have since manipulated the focus on capacity in order "to
argue both for the liberation and for the greater protection of
children.""29
Scholars have argued that competency represents the central issue
in determining the rights of children under the law, and have sug-
gested that psychological research is necessary to determine the ca-
pacity of children to make legal decisions.299 On the one hand,
opponents of children's rights argue that children should not have
legal rights because of their general incapacity to make meaningful
and rational choices.300 On the other hand, supporters of children's
rights counter that "principles of liberty and justice mandate the ex-
tension of legal rights to those children with capacity," and that a
child's level of competence should only serve to determine the extent
of her rights.3° 1 Clearly, no discussion of children's rights can ignore
the issue of competence.
A. Why Competence Is Essential in Medical Treatment Cases
Assessment of a minor's competence constitutes an essential ele-
ment in determining whether a child should enjoy standing and in-
dependent representation in medical treatment cases for two main
and is therefore in a better position to assess the minor's capabilities. Wilber, supra
note 9, at 357. Others insist that, for precisely this reason, the attorney cannot make
an objective assessment, and maintain that the court should assess the minor's compe-
tence after a court hearing. See Lyon, supra note 23, at 699-701. In litigated medical
treatment disputes, the minor's physician has likely already made an independent as-
sessment of the minor's competence to consent to or refuse the proposed treatment.
As a third alternative, perhaps the court could rely, at least in part, on the physician's
determination of the minor's capacity to consent.
297. Federle, supra note 296, at 987. For example, philosophers such as Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who advocated social contract the-
ory, held that "children have no freedom because of their incompetencies and are
instead subject to parental authority until they attain capacity." Id Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill stressed the utility principle-that political society revolves
around the natural tendency to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Competency to seek
personal happiness represents an integral part of this philosophy. This political phi-
losophy, too, excludes children because they lack the ability to pursue their own hap-
piness. If children cannot achieve their own happiness, "then their liberty canjustifiably be curtailed by others until they reach maturity." Id at 995-96.
298. IL at 1011.
299. See, e.g., Gary B. Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State
of the Art, 22 J. Fain. L. 445, 450 (1983-84) (arguing that, because children's incompe-
tence has served as a basis for limiting their rights, developmental research will likely
prove to be "especially probative evidence in determining the social facts basic to
legal policy affecting children").
300. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 40, at 645 (arguing that "[t]o be a child is to be
at risk, dependent, and without capacity... to decide what is 'best' for oneself"(emphasis omitted)); Hafen, supra note 103, at 657-58 (asserting that according chil-
dren rights prematurely will damage individual liberty).
301. Federle, supra note 296, at 1013.
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reasons. First, the minor must be competent to make decisions about
her medical treatment for the court to recognize and protect her posi-
tion regarding the treatment decision. Second, the minor must have
the capacity to participate fully in the litigation if the case proceeds to
court.
1. Capacity to Make Medical Treatment Decisions
Competence-which is an integral part of being able to make medi-
cal treatment decisions-lies at the heart of the doctrine of informed
consent. Informed consent is the treatment authorization given by a
patient to the physician.3°0 The law imposes on physicians a legal duty
to provide the patient, prior to treatment, with information about (1)
the particular procedures and treatments; (2) the benefits of the pro-
posed treatment; (3) any significant risks associated with such treat-
ment; and (4) feasible alternatives. 3 The physician must convey this
information to the patient in a manner that the patient understands
and under circumstances that allow the patient to reflect on the pro-
posed treatment and ask follow-up questions."° Equally importantly,
the physician must communicate to the patient that the patient pos-
sesses the right and responsibility to make the final decisions about
treatment.
305
Traditionally, courts have viewed children as lacking the requisite
capacity to make decisions for themselves concerning their own medi-
cal treatment. As Justice Burger stated in Parham v. J.R. ,3
°6 "Most
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judg-
ments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical
care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments. ' ' 0 7
Nevertheless, the practice of requiring informed consent from patients
stems from a deeply rooted respect for individual autonomy,308 and
thus should apply to child patients as well as adult patients.
Despite the presumption that children lack the capacity to give in-
formed consent, empirical research within the last decade has demon-
strated that some children have a much greater capacity to provide
informed consent than the legal community has recognized.309 For ex-
ample, one study examined the developmental differences between
children and adults when making medical and psychiatric treatment
302. Nancy M.P. King & Alan W. Cross, Children as Decision Makers: Guidelines




306. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
307. Id. at 603.
308. Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed Consent for
Mental Health Treatment, 50 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 695, 704 (1993).
309. See Mlyniec, supra note 282, at 1881-83 & nn.37-54; Redding, supra note 308,
at 708.
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decisions.31 0 The researchers found that although significant differ-
ences existed between nine-year-old children and adults in decision-
making capacity, little or no difference in competence existed between
fourteen-year-old adolescents and adults.31" ' Another study showed
that children as young as ten or eleven appear to have a factual under-
standing and appreciation of the risks and benefits of psychother-
apy.312 Finally, a third study demonstrated that even children as
young as nine years old appear to understand many basic aspects of
medical treatment, including differences between various diagnoses
and prognoses, as well as treatment risks and benefits.31 3 Thus, argua-
bly, a consengus has emerged that "children are capable of quite a lot,
if you just let them participate in the decision-making process."3 '
In addition to social science research, the medical literature appears
to support the practice of obtaining informed consent from minors
and inviting their participation in their own health care decisions to
the greatest extent possible.3 15 Physicians believe that:
Informed consent... is more than just a legal obligation, imposed
on the physician by society, to give information to patients... about
their condition and proposed treatment, and to obtain consent
before proceeding with treatment. It also has a moral basis funda-
mental to human relationships: the recognition of individual auton-
omy, dignity, and the capacity for self-determination. 316
The medical community remains faithful to the notion that individual
autonomy and fairness require that children receive greater opportu-
nity to participate in their own health care decisions when they pos-
sess the capacity to do so. 317
Moreover, physicians and psychologists maintain that many benefits
result from allowing children to participate in medical decision mak-
ing. Recognition of a child's decision-making capacities often results
in improved patient care and treatment effectiveness. 318 Participation
by children in treatment decisions may also serve to reduce the stress
310. Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Ad-
olescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 Child Dev. 1589 (1982).
311. Id. at 1595-96; see also Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to
Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 Prof. Psychol. 412, 423 (1978) (finding that
minors age 15 and above are no less competent to provide consent than are adults,
that no assumptions can be made about the ability of minors age 11-14 to consent to
treatment, and that minors below age 11 generally do not have the intellectual ability
to satisfy a legal standard for competent consent).
312. Nancy Kayser-Boyd et al., Minors' Ability to Identify Risks and Benefits of
Therapy, 16 Prof. Psychol.: Res. & Prac. 411, 416 (1985).
313. See Michael C. Roberts et al., Children's Perceptions of Medical and Psycho-
logical Disorders in Their Peers, 10 J. Clinical Child Psychol. 76, 77-78 (1981).
314. Redding, supra note 308, at 708.
315. King & Cross, supra note 302, at 10.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 10-11.
318. Id, at 10.
1996] 2119
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of treatment.319 Additionally, children may have better attitudes
about their treatment if they participate in the decision-making pro-
cess, which, in turn, leads to more successful treatment because chil-
dren will often be more willing to cooperate.320 Finally, since minors
usually have had limited experience with exercising their rights, per-
mitting minors to exercise their right to make treatment decisions may
actually assist them in developing decision-making competence with
respect to legal issues and life choices, enabling them gradually to as-
sume adult responsibilities.32'
Of course, a court should not recognize a child's standing in a medi-
cal treatment case if the child, at the outset, lacks the requisite compe-
tence to give or refuse informed consent for the proposed treatment.
Permitting the child to have independent representation in the pro-
ceeding allows her to present her views to the court concerning the
particular treatment, thereby giving her the opportunity to protect her
interests in the matter. If the child cannot make a mature, reasoned
decision whether to accept or refuse the proposed treatment because
she cannot understand the nature of the treatment itself, its risks and
benefits, and possible alternatives, her participation in the decision-
making process is of no value. Social science data indicate, however,
that many minors are capable of understanding these aspects of medi-
cal treatment, and thus, are competent to make informed treatment
decisions.3z The medical community also appears to agree with the
practice of involving minors in treatment decisions, if they possess the
requisite capacity.323 Thus, competency presents the central issue in
determining the rights of minors under the law324 and the competence
to give informed consent represents an essential inquiry in determin-
ing whether to afford a minor standing in medical treatment cases.
2. Capacity to Participate in the Litigation
The minor's ability to participate fully in the litigation and to guide
her attorney reinforces the importance of competence in determining
whether a minor should be afforded an independent advocate in a
319. Gary B. Melton, Children's Participation in Treatment Planning: Psychological
and Legal Issues, 12 Prof. Psychol. 246, 250-51 (1981); see also Gary B. Melton, Deci-
sion Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits, in Children's Compe-
tence to Consent 21, 31 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (stating that children's
participation in decision making may serve as an "inoculation" against the stress in-
volved in making the decision).
320. Rochelle T. Bastien & Howard S. Adelman, Noncompulsory Versus Legally
Mandated Placement, Perceived Choice, and Response to Treatment Among Adoles-
cents, 52 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 171, 177 (1984).
321. Redding, supra note 308, at 709.
322. See supra notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
324. See Melton, supra note 299, at 448.
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medical treatment case.325 First, at a minimum, the child must be ca-
pable of communicating her wishes to her attorney.326 This basic re-
quirement alone, however, does not sufficiently enable the attorney to
represent the child effectively. Not only must the child be competent
to articulate her desires verbally, but she must be in a position to di-
rect her attorney and the course of the litigation.2 7 To do so, the
child must understand the consequences of her decision, and the
child's attorney must be sure that the child's decision reflects a legiti-
mate opinion and not simply a momentary whim.3 s In the words of
one commentator:
Children may fail to comprehend crucial concepts, issues, or the
possible consequences of their decisions. They may also fantasize
or be prone to indecisive or inconsistent behavior. As a counselor,
the attorney must advise and help the child to understand not only
what his choices are, but also the potential results of those choices.
As an advocate, the attorney must make or obtain some determina-
tion as to when a child's utterances could not reasonably be
presented to the court as the child's position.329
Thus, to justify providing the minor with independent representation,
the minor must not only be capable of expressing her viewpoint, she
must also be able to understand and accept the long-term conse-
quences of her decision if the court gives weight to her preferences.
Whenever the attorney acts as a traditional advocate for a minor in
a case, the representation will likely raise serious issues concerning the
minor's ability to participate fully in the litigation. Thus, in addition
to demonstrating capacity to give or refuse informed consent about
the proposed treatment itself, the minor must also be competent to
direct her attorney in the litigation and reach considered judgments
about the views she wishes her attorney to present to the court.
325. Competence on the part of the minor likely represents a necessary prerequi-
site to full participation in any type of proceeding. See Guggenheim, supra note 8, at
92-93. Professor Guggenheim states that "it is the capacity of the client and not the
type of proceeding that determines the nature of the attorney-client relationship in
the adult context. There is little reason for adopting a different rule where a juvenile
client is involved." ld. at 92.
326. See id. at 93.
327. See Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy of the
Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1955, 1963(1996); Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 77 (stating that appointing counsel for young
children "creates major difficulties" because they are too young to direct their attor-
neys); Lyon, supra note 23, at 698.
328. See Lyon, supra note 23, at 695; see also Lurie, supra note 22, at 233 (question-
ing whether the views of a five-year-old child would be sufficiently mature for an
attorney to argue them in court).
329. Lyon, supra note 23, at 695-96 (footnote omitted).
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B. How Competence of Minors is Assessed
No single, agreed-upon method of measuring a child's competence
exists. In fact, as one group of researchers noted, "The search for a
single test of competency is a search for a Holy Grail. ' 330 A thorough
examination of all existing measures and theories of competence ex-
tends beyond the scope of this Note. Despite disagreement within
and among various disciplines, however, several proposed models of
defining competence in children have gained acceptance and merit
comment. These models fall into three categories: legal standards of
competence, psycho-social assessments of competence, and medical
community standards of competence.
1. Legal Standards of Competence
Legal standards of competence include chronological age cutoffs
and individualized assessments of maturity. Chronological age cutoffs
provide a simple and convenient means of classifying which people
are entitled to the rights and privileges of society.331 Lawmakers de-
fine capacity based on chronological age, and therefore afford rights
and privileges based on age as well. For example, state and federal
governments set minimum age requirements for drinking, driving,
smoking, and voting.332 Chronological age cutoffs, however, consti-
tute a deficient test for several reasons. First, age cutoffs represent an
arbitrary means of assessing maturity.333 Second, they do not take
into account individual variation. Minors do not magically attain in-
creased powers of judgment and comprehension at a fixed age; rather,
individual children develop at varying rates.334 Thus, an immature
nineteen-year-old adolescent may vote even if he will not exercise this
right wisely, but a seventeen-year-old adolescent who has demon-
strated her maturity will be denied this right. Finally, "where the mi-
nor stands to lose a fundamental personal right, the convenience of a
chronological cutoff comes at too high a cost. '335 Despite their flaws,
chronological age cutoffs still offer the benefit of a clear and concise
standard that is universally applicable.336
Case-by-case assessments of maturity represent another common
method of determining competence in the legal community. A mi-
nor's maturity may be defined both by statute, through emancipation
and mature minor statutes, or by common law, under the mature mi-
330. Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Am. J.
Psychiatry 279, 283 (1977).
331. Mlyniec, supra note 282, at 1876-77; Lyon, supra note 23, at 696.
332. Lyon, supra note 23, at 696 n.101.
333. Wilber, supra note 9, at 357.
334. Lyon, supra note 23, at 696.
335. Id. at 697.
336. Id. at 697-98.
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nor doctrine.337 The general rule deems minors to be legally incompe-
tent to make medical decisions on their own behalf.338 The law,
however, provides a few narrow exceptions to this rule. For instance,
a legally emancipated minor may be entitled to consent to her own
medical treatment.339 An emancipated minor is one whose parents
have relinquished all control and authority over her.340 Many states
require a judicial determination of emancipation, and courts will only
do so under statutorily prescribed circumstances." 1 Although the
statutory definition of emancipation varies from state to state, exam-
ples of circumstances that warrant a minor's emancipation include
marriage, financial independence, separation from parents, military
service, pregnancy, and parenthood.342
In addition to legal emancipation, a minor might also be deemed
competent enough to consent to medical treatment on her own behalf
under a mature minor statute.343 Mature minor statutes permit mi-
nors to consent to treatment for specific medical conditions. 44 Medi-
cal "conditions" covered under mature minor statutes often include
pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, contraception, substance
abuse, and mental illness.345 Mature minor statutes do not necessarily
involve a finding of maturity per se; rather, these provisions aim to
encourage minors to seek needed medical care, in a confidential man-
ner, that they might not otherwise seek if parental consent were re-
quired." 6 Some mature minor statutes impose an age threshold that
the minor must reach before she can consent to treatment for her-
self.347 Other mature minor statutes are discretionary, and the minor
must make an affirmative showing of competence. 348 Still other stat-
337. See id. at 698.








346. Id.; Wadlington, supra note 93, at 323-24.
347. Sigman & O'Connor, supra note 6, at 521; see, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-8-4 (1990)(permitting any minor over 14 years of age to provide consent to any legally author-
ized medical, dental, or mental health treatment for herself); l. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch.
410, §§ 210/1, 210/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995) (permitting a minor under 18
who is married or pregnant to consent to her own medical treatment and permitting a
minor 12 years or older to seek medical attention on her own if she believes she has
venereal disease or is an alcoholic or drug addict).
348. Redding, supra note 308, at 715; see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-602(7)(Michie 1991) (providing that "[a]ny unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to
understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical
treatment or procedures" may provide the necessary consent); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 129.030(2) (Michie 1993) (stating that a minor "who understands the nature and
purpose of the proposed examination or treatment and its probable outcome, and
voluntarily requests it" may consent).
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utes simply refer to the term "minor" with no mention of an age or
maturity requirement. 49
Finally, in states without an applicable mature minor statute, the
common law mature minor doctrine permits minors to consent to
medical treatment for themselves. Under this doctrine, "minors
who are able to understand the nature and consequences of the medi-
cal treatment offered are considered mature enough to consent to or
refuse the treatment. '35 1 Courts have employed the mature minor
doctrine to determine when to defer to a minor's wishes.3 52 For exam-
ple, in Bellotti v. Baird,3  the Supreme Court specifically recom-
mended a maturity test to determine the right of a minor to decide to
have an abortion without parental consent.354 Similarly, the Illinois
Supreme Court, in In re E.G. 355 held that the mature minor doctrine
affords a minor in Illinois the common law right to consent to or re-
fuse medical treatment if she establishes by clear and convincing evi-
dence that she is "mature enough to appreciate the consequence of
her actions" and "mature enough to exercise the judgment of an
adult. ' 356 The fact, however, that no court or statute has ever articu-
lated a precise standard for determining whether a minor is mature
poses a significant problem with the application of the mature minor
doctrine.357 In Bellotti, the Court stated that the judge's determina-
tion of maturity in the abortion context would be made on a case-by-
case basis358 and would "reflect personal and societal values and mo-
res."359 Other state and federal case law provides no clear guidance
on the matter either, perhaps due to difficulty in interpreting statutory
language.36° In In re E.G., for example, the Illinois Supreme court did
349. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.20.025(a)(4) (1995) (stating that "a minor may give
consent for diagnosis, prevention or treatment of pregnancy, and for diagnosis and
treatment of venereal disease"); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-132.01 (1994) (providing
that a "minor who may have contracted a venereal disease may give consent to the
furnishing of hospital or medical care related to the diagnosis or treatment of such
disease").
350. Sigman & O'Connor, supra note 6, at 521.
351. Id.
352. Lyon, supra note 23, at 698.
353. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
354. Id. at 647 (stating that if a minor "satisfies the court that she is mature and well
enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court
must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent").
355. 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
356. Id. at 327-28.
357. See Katherine M. Waters, Note, Judicial Consent to Abort: Assessing a Minor's
Maturity, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 90, 110 (1985) (citing a "judicial as well as a legisla-
tive failure to delineate specific criteria and approaches for assessing minors' matur-
ity"). This commentator attributes the lack of a standard for assessing maturity in the
abortion context to the requirement that judicial proceedings be kept confidential to
protect the anonymity of the minor. Id. at 109 n.111.
358. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 n.23 (1979).
359. Id. at 655.
360. Waters, supra note 357, at 109-12.
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not articulate a standard of maturity; rather, it simply affirmed the
appellate court's endorsement of the trial court's determination that
the minor was mature.36'
Scholars and commentators have attempted to articulate standards
to assist in the assessment of maturity, applicable to all decision mak-
ing by minors, not just to health care decision making. According to
one commentator, an appropriate standard for determining the matur-
ity of a minor would be to assess her "ability to know and understand
the relevant facts, options, and probable outcomes in a particular deci-
sion.' ': 61 The object of this test, analogous to the standard used to
determine a testator's competence to make a will, would be to ensure
that the minor understands the purpose for which she is making the
particular decision, the reasonable options that exist, and the likely
consequences of her decision, to herself and to others. 3 ,3 This ap-
proach assesses a minor's maturity on a sliding scale. The minor's
competence to make a particular decision will vary according to the
minor's age and the complexity of the issue involved;364 the greater
the maturity the minor demonstrates, the greater the weight that
should be given to the minor's preferences.365
Other commentators argue that, because maturity is so closely cor-
related to age, age-based presumptions offer a very effective means of
assessing maturity.366 These commentators propose that if a minor is
under a specified age, she should be presumed immature and incapa-
ble of making reasoned decisions.3 67 Age-based presumptions resem-
ble chronological age cutoffs, except that they leave room for
individual variation by allowing a minor to present evidence of matur-
ity to overcome the presumption of immaturity.3 68 Proponents of age-
based presumptions, while acknowledging their arbitrariness, praise
361. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 324, 327-28 (IM. 1989).
362. Lyon, supra note 23, at 698.
363. Id. at 699.
364. Id
365. Lurie, supra note 22, at 233-34. A sliding scale of maturity accords with the
New York State Bar Association's Law Guardian Representation Standards, which
recommend that in the case of a young child, the extent to which the law guardian will
advocate the child's wishes in a child protective or termination of parental rights pro-
ceeding "depends in large part on the child's age, maturity and capacity." New York
State Bar Association, Committee on Juvenile Justice and Child Welfare, Law Guard-
ian Representation Standards 126, 167 (1988).
366. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 23, at 697 (touting "age-grading" as "useful as a
rebuttable presumption to aid courts in making individual determinations of
competence").
367. Wilber, supra note 9, at 357; see, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 8, at 91 (identi-
fying age seven as the age at which a minor has the capacity to direct her counsel in a
delinquency proceeding); Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection
Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 Fain. L.Q. 287, 312-
15 (1983) (identifying seven years as the age at which most children have the intellec-
tual capacity to make reasoned decisions).
368. Wilber, supra note 9, at 357.
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them for "introduc[ing] an expedited, objective step in the assessment
process." '369 Unless the minor is represented by counsel at the outset,
however, she has no means by which to rebut the presumption of in-
competence. Thus, in effect, an age-based presumption may not differ
significantly from a chronological age cutoff.
2. Psycho-Social Assessments of Competence
Many social science researchers focus on the cognitive abilities of
children when assessing their competence.3 0 A large body of re-
search stems from Piagetian Cognitive Development theory. 71 Piaget
posited that cognitive development occurs along a continuum, with
intellectual capacity increasing at four major stages in childhood.372
According to Piaget, children are essentially incapable of truly intel-
lectual thought before the age of seven.373 Between ages seven and
eleven, children gradually develop the intellectual capacity to under-
stand causation and gain a more objective view of the universe. 74 Be-
tween the ages of eleven and fifteen, children's thinking approaches
full maturity, and they begin to think and understand like adults.375
Despite criticism of Piagetian Cognitive Development theory,376 sub-
sequent research has borne out its validity.37 7 Consistent with Piaget's
findings, the bulk of this research shows "significant differences be-
tween the cognitive abilities of children and adolescents and little or
no difference between the cognitive abilities of later adolescents and
adults. 378
369. Id.
370. For a thorough treatment of child development research and theory, see
Mlyniec, supra note 282, at 1878-85.
371. Piagetian Cognitive Development theory reflects the work of Jean Piaget, an
influential researcher in the area of child development.
372. See Mlyniec, supra note 282, at 1878-79 (citing R. Murray Thomas, Comparing
Theories of Child Development 285-99 (3d ed. 1992)). Piaget reported his findings in
several books. For convenience," this Note refers to the works of other scholars who
have synthesized Piaget's work and presented it in a more concise fashion.
373. Id. at 1879 (citing Thomas, supra note 372, at 290-95).
374. IL. (citing Thomas, supra note 372, at 295-98).
375. Id. (citing Thomas, supra note 372, at 298-99).
376. See id. at 1880 & nn.29-34, 1883 & nn.55-56 (citing several commentators who
have criticized Piaget's findings as well as the findings of those studies that have sup-
ported Piaget's conclusions).
377. For instance, Weithorn and Campbell found little or no difference between the
capacity of 14-year-old adolescents and adults to make medical treatment decisions,
but found a marked difference between nine-year-old children and 14-year-old ado-
lescents. Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 310, at 1595-96. Another study examining
how people seek information in decision making found no change in the amount of
information children examine after the age of 12. Yoshiaki Nakajima & Miho Hotta,
A Developmental Study of Cognitive Processes in Decision Making: Information
Searching as a Function of Task Complexity, 64 Psychol. Rep. 67,77 (1989). For other
studies confirming Piaget's theories, see Mlyniec, supra note 282, at 1881-83 & nn.38-
54.
378. Mlyniec, supra note 282, at 1881.
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Other studies emphasize the contextual nature of development.
While Piagetian theory may demonstrate that a minor develops full
cognitive capacity by late adolescence, other factors exert strong influ-
ences during her development that certainly will bear upon her overall
level of competence and decision-making capacity.3 79 Equally impor-
tantly, learning is a dynamic process that is reinforced by experience.
Thus, through the process of trial and error, a minor will make better
decisions each time she approaches or confronts a decision-making
opportunity. 8 °
3. Medical Community Standards of Competence
Assessment of competence in the medical community can be di-
rectly traced to the doctrine of informed consent. Physicians assess a
minor's medical treatment decision-making capacity by evaluating her
ability to provide or refuse informed consent.38 ' Physicians consider
four factors in assessing decision-making capacity: (1) reasoning abil-
ity; (2) understanding; (3) voluntariness; and (4) the nature of the de-
cision to be made.38 While a patient's reasoning depends on her age,
intellectual capacity, and cognitive and emotional functioning, the
medical community recommends that physicians and parents also as-
sess the minor's ability to consider future consequences, her history of
learning from past mistakes, her tendency toward impulsiveness ver-
sus cautious reflection, and her level of comfort with making the treat-
ment decision.38 3 In assessing the minor's understanding, medical
experts encourage the physician to consider whether the child has any
specific knowledge, information, experience, or misconceptions about
the medical problem or the proposed treatment decision.31 Under-
standing also includes the minor's comprehension of the implications
of the treatment decision.385 The physician can analyze the minor's
understanding by asking her how she perceives the matter and by ask-
ing more direct questions.386 Voluntariness represents the degree to
which the patient's decision is free from coercion and manipulation by
others.3" Because minors are often quite susceptible to influence by
379. See id. at 1883-84 & nn.57-70 (noting studies that demonstrate the strong effect
of such forces as peer influence, the tendency to focus on immediate consequences,
and the inclination to make risky choices on adolescent decision-making capacity).
380. See id at 1884-85 & nn.71-79 (citing studies demonstrating the importance of
learning on attaining decision-making competence).
381. King & Cross, supra note 302, at 12.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 12-13.
384. Id- at 13; see also Sanford Leikin, The Role of Adolescents in Decisions Con-
cerning Their Cancer Therapy, 71 Cancer 3342, 3344-45 (Supp. 1993) (stressing the
importance of knowing what the adolescent understands about the cancer and its
treatment outcomes when the adolescent refuses treatment).
385. Sigman & O'Connor, supra note 6, at 523.




their parents, the physician must attempt to understand the family dy-
namics to assess the minor's voluntariness. 88 Finally, the gravity of
the medical condition and the treatment decision, the immediacy of
the need for a decision, and the risk-benefit ratio will also affect the
minor's medical decision-making capacity.
389
Another approach suggests that, in addition to assessing cognitive
capacity for decision making, the physician examine the minor's set of
values concerning treatment, or her "conception of the good.
3 91
Conception of the good is described as follows:
Possession of a set of values, or a conception of one's good, allows
the individual to evaluate the treatment alternatives and their re-
spective components as benefits or harms and to assign them rela-
tive weights. The conception of one's good should be sufficiently
consistent and stable so that the treatment choice is maintained long
enough for the treatment to be completed. It should also encom-
pass the ability to assign appropriate weight to future consequences
of present decisions and should reflect the predictable ways that
one's values and goals will change over time.?9
A critical factor in assessing a minor's conception of the good is the
extent to which her values reflect her future interests.3 2 If a minor
lacks the ability to anticipate her future, she may give inadequate
weight to the effect of a decision on her future interests and be unable
to anticipate future changes in her values.3 93 The minor's limited ex-
perience may contribute to her inability to assess her present values
and her future goals.394 Due to these concerns, physicians frequently
hesitate to rely fully on the values of the minor in making a medical
treatment decision.395
Regardless of the standard employed to assess competence, many
medical commentators agree that minors under the age of fourteen
should not be permitted to consent to or refuse treatment on their
own behalf.396 By contrast, others recommend a case-by-case deter-
mination of a minor's capacity to consent and recommend involving
388. Id.
389. Id. at 14.
390. Leikin, supra note 384, at 3342-43.





396. See, e.g., John C. Fletcher et al., Ethical Considerations in Pediatric Oncology,
in Principles and Practice of Pediatric Oncology 309, 312 (Philip A. Pizzo & David G.
Poplack eds., 1989) (presenting a view that patient assent should not be required of
adolescents younger than 14 years of age); Leikin, supra note 384, at 3344 (stating
that, with a disease such as cancer, a "paternalistic approach seems logical for the
adolescent younger than 14 years"); Sigman & O'Connor, supra note 6, at 522 (stating
that "[a] patient should be at least 14 years of age to consent to medical treatment").
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her in the decision-making process to a degree commensurate with
her current capacity. 97
C. Proposed Model: A Rebuttable Presumption of Competence
Whether a minor is deemed competent will necessarily vary accord-
ing to who is making the assessment, the measure of competence that
is employed, and the nature of the decision that the minor must make.
Given that many studies show that minors, even quite young children,
possess an adult level of competence to make decisions,398 the most
logical approach to assessing competence is a rebuttable presumption
of competence. Children's rights advocates support this approach.
For example, Hillary Rodham Clinton maintains that the presumption
that children are incompetent should be set aside in favor of a pre-
sumption that children are capable of exercising rights and assuming
responsibilities until proven otherwise.399 Similarly, Henry Foster, in
A "Bill of Rights" for Children, proposed that the law grant children
individual freedom and autonomy commensurate with their maturity
and development, and that the burden should be on the party who
wishes to abridge the child's freedom and autonomy to demonstrate
that his position is in the child's best interests. ° ° More recently, the
1995 Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representa-
tion of Children adopted a standard that presumes the minor client's
capacity to make decisions about her legal representation.40 ' Un-
doubtedly, the focus should be placed on the decision-making process
rather than on the decision itself.402 The individual making the assess-
ment of competence should consider the minor's ability to under-
stand, to reason, and to communicate. 4 3 And, if that individual
cannot demonstrate that the minor lacks capacity, the minor should
participate fully in the decision-making process.40 4
397. King & Cross, supra note 302, at 11.
398. See Melton, supra note 299, at 463 (suggesting that even young children have
the capacity to make certain decisions); see also supra notes 309-14 and accompanying
text (discussing studies disputing the perception that children generally lack the ca-
pacity to make decisions).
399. Rodham, supra note 10, at 508.
400. Foster, supra note 257, at 73.
401. See Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Repre-
sentation of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1301, 1312 (1996) (part V.A.1); Report of
the Working Group on Determining the Child's Capacity to Make Decisions, 64 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1339, 1339 (1996); Report of the Working Group on Interviewing and
Counseling, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1351, 1352-53 (1996).
402. See Ramsey, supra note 367, at 316.
403. Id. at 309.
404. See Ann Palmeri, Childhood's End: Toward the Liberation of Children, in
Whose Child? 105, 112 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980)
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V. STANDING AND INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION OF
COMPETENT MINORS IN PRACTICE
As demonstrated, competent minors must have standing and in-
dependent representation in litigated medical treatment disputes.
This part applies these recommendations to the cases of Billy Best and
Lee Lor in an attempt to illustrate how they would work in practice.
These cases demonstrate how this model may operate differently de-
pending on which parties differ over the proposed medical treatment
decision. In Billy Best's case, the parents' and the child's wishes con-
flict. By contrast, in Lee Lor's case, both she and her parents oppose
treatment, a decision that conflicts with the position of the state.
Assuming that Billy Best, his parents, and his physician could not
resolve the issue of further chemotherapy for Billy privately, the dis-
pute might reach a court in one of two ways. Billy's parents could
seek a court order requiring Billy to undergo continued treatment
against his wishes. Alternatively, Billy could initiate the proceeding,
seeking a judicial declaration that his parents cannot force him to ac-
cept treatment that he does not want. In either situation, a court
would first have to recognize that Billy has standing to challenge the
treatment decision his parents have already made on his behalf.
Because Billy is sixteen years old, the judge would likely presume
him competent to make the decision to refuse further chemotherapy.
Any party opposed to his standing would be required to demonstrate
that Billy is incompetent to make the.decision to refuse treatment on
his own behalf. Such a showing would be difficult to make, given that
Billy has already undergone five months of chemotherapy treat-
ment.405 The court would deem Billy's reason for refusing treatment
to be rational, based on an assessment of his quality of life. In the
past, chemotherapy made Billy feel even more sick and depressed
than did the cancer itself.406 To Billy, the pain and discomfort of con-
tinuing chemotherapy may outweigh its tenuous promise of long-term
improvement.
Assuming the case proceeds to court, Billy would appear by in-
dependent counsel whose function would be to argue Billy's position
to the court. Again, Billy's attorney would learn that Billy is quite
capable of communicating his views to her, and that his wishes consti-
tute a mature, considered point of view. Accordingly, Billy's attorney
would have no reason lo doubt Billy's competence to participate fully
in the litigation or the appropriateness of his position. The court
would consider Billy's position along with those of his parents and any
other parties to the proceeding, and reach what it considers to be a
405. Knox, supra note 1, at 1.
406. See Jon Auerbach, It's Back to Class But No Chemo for Norwell Boy, Boston
Globe, Nov. 23, 1994, at 19.
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just outcome.4 °7 Billy's important personal rights of informed con-
sent, bodily integrity, and privacy would receive protection in the
process.
In fifteen-year-old Lee Lor's case, the state would initiate the court
proceeding. The state would challenge Lee Lor's parents' refusal to
consent to the necessary chemotherapy treatment for ovarian cancer
on grounds that such a refusal constitutes statutory child neglect.
Normally, only Lee Lor's parents and the state would be formal par-
ties to the proceeding. Under the proposed model, Lee Lor would be
a named party as well. Again, the court and her attorney would pre-
sume Lee Lor's competence to refuse treatment on her own behalf.
Lee Lor's decision reflects her "suspicion of Western medicine ' 40 8 as
well as her wish not to "suffer hair loss, nausea and other side effects
of chemotherapy unless doctors could guarantee good results. 40 9 Lee
Lor's position would be but one among several the court considers,
and "[m]erely advocating a position does not guarantee its success. '"410
The judge, as the ultimate decision maker, is bound to make a deci-
sion that comports with the child's best interests. 411 Thus, considera-
tion of Lee Lor's viewpoint along with those of the other parties in
interest would not compromise the judge's function.412 Rather, in-
cluding Lee Lor's perspective would serve to protect her right to par-
ticipate in the treatment decision. Certainly, this scenario presents a
preferable outcome to that which did, in fact, occur-removal from
her home by force by a team of police, paramedics, and social work-
ers, and imposition of chemotherapy against her will. 41 3
CONCLUSION
The rights of privacy and bodily integrity are fundamental, and
courts accord these rights great respect. True respect for these impor-
tant personal rights includes the recognition that every competent in-
dividual, regardless of age, has a right to participate in the acceptance
or refusal of medical treatment. Currently, minors lack legal standing
to challenge medical treatment decisions that other parties reach on
their behalf. In cases where the state seeks to compel treatment over
parental objection, or where the parents make a decision that opposes
the minor's wishes, the minor lacks access to an attorney whose role is
to present the minor's position regarding treatment to the court. The
traditional model thus deprives the most interested party in the pro-
ceeding of a voice.
407. Wilber, supra note 9, at 354.
408. Perkins, supra note 2, at B10.
409. Pulaski, supra note 3, at B2.
410. Wilber, supra note 9, at 354.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Perkins, supra note 2, at B10; Pulaski, supra note 3, at B2.
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Courts in litigated medical treatment disputes must recognize that
competent minors have rights and interests, apart from those of their
parent§ and the state, that require protection. To make these rights
meaningful, the minor in such cases must have independent represen-
tation in the form of an advocate who will present to the court the
minor's preferred outcome. In following this alternative model, courts
and attorneys for minors would play an integral role in protecting the
right of minors to participate in the treatment decision-making pro-
cess and in preserving her fundamental rights of privacy and bodily
integrity.
